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2001: A CODE ODYSSEY
(NEW DAWN FOR THE ARTICLE 9
SECURED CREDITOR)
INGRID MICHELSEN HILLINGER AND MICHAEL G. HILLINGER'
I. INTRODUCTION
Revised Article 9 was promulgated in 1998 with an effective date
of July I, 2001. 1 The delayed effective date was intended to give all
states time to "get on board the Revised Article 9 train." As of this
writing (July I, 200 I), 46 states and the District of Columbia have
adopted Revised Article 9. It awaits the governor's signature in the 4
other states.2 Although all states have adopted Revised Article 9, some
have delayed its effective date beyond July 1,200 I to allow their filing
offices to gear up for the new regime.3
Many trees have died and many CLE credits have already been
earned in the name of understanding Revised Article 9. It contains 80
definitions, 126 provisions and is 298 pages long. Its predecessor, puny
by comparison, has 14 definitions, 57 provisions and spans a mere 129
pages.
The revisions significantly expand Article 9's scope to include
security interests in a commercial debtor's deposits accounts, tort claims
and health-care insurance receivables. Sales of promissory notes and
• Ingrid Michelson Hillinger. Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School.
Michael G. Hillinger is Prolessor. Professor and Associate Dean of Southem New England Law
School. Thanks to Evan Hammons. BeL.S 2001. for his help on the treacherous Transition Rules.
and to Jacqueline Hernandez. BCLS 2002. for her help with the Consumer Rules. Special thanks
to Darald and Juliet Libby for their generous support of faculty research ta Boston College Law
School.
I. All references to Revised Article 9 are to Article 9 of the Revised Uniform Commercial
Code ("R.U.C.C.") as amended in 2000.
2. Connecticut. Massachusetts. Missouri. and New York.
3. See. e.g. Connecticut (ellective October I. 2001): Alabanla Florida. and Mississippi
(ellective January I. 2002).
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payment intangibles (a new Article 9 life fonn) come within the Article
9 umbrella as do consignments and agricultural statutory liens. The
revisions penn it filing to perfect a security interest in instruments. They
enlarge the definition of"proceeds" to include pretty much anything and
everything remotely connected to or derived from the original collateral.
They authorize secured transactions involving non-assignable, non-
transferable property, e.g., licenses.
The revisions resolve most existing ambiguities (although not all).4
For instance, they establish a rebuttable presumption rule for noncom-
plying commercial dispositions. They override the transfonnation rule
in a commercial setting, invalidate trade name filings, validate "all
assets" financing statements, distinguish software from goods, and give
the secured creditor in possession priority over a non-consumer buyer of
the collateral. They redefine the tenn "debtor." "Debtor" is no longer
the party indebted. That's the obligor under new Article 9 if the two
are different. The debtor is the person with the interest in the collateral,
e.g., the owner ofthe collateral.6 For some old dogs anyway, the change
is counterintuitive and initially maddening,? but the new definitions do
bring needed clarity to who must do or give what to whom postdefault.8
4. For instance. the Revisions provide no enlightenment on when a debtor has '"rights in the
collateral.'" See Margit Livingston. Certainty. EffiCiency. & Realism: Rights in Collateral under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 73 N.C. L. REV. 115 (1994) (arguing that the
requirement that a debtor have "rights in the collateral" should be deleted from Article 9 because
of the confusion and uncertainty it has generated in the case law). Professor Livingston identifies
two primary areas of confusion: (I) when a debtor has possession of collateral. but does not own
it: and (2) when a debtor does not have possession of the collateral. but still has some rights in it.
She proposes that. at least as far as tangible goods are concerned. having rights in collateral be
eliminated as a required element ofattachment under § 9-203. Failing that. she urges the adoption
of specific priority and filing rules to deal with the trouble spots she identifies in her article. Id. at
184.
Similarly. the revisions do not define '"public sale" and "private sale" for purposes of the
kind of notice the foreclosing creditor must send to the debtor. See R.U.C.C. § 9-613.
5. RU.C.C. § 9-102(a)(59).
6. R.U.C.C. § 9-1 02(a)(28). We share this information with you so you do not embarrass
yourselfin front ofcolleagues and friends by calling the person who owes the obligation a '"debtor:'
7. This change in terminology produced severe agitation tor one ofthe authors. but with the
love and support of friends and family. she was able to pick up the pieces and move on.
8. So. tor instance. R.U.C.C. § 9-611(b) requires the secured party to send a '"reasonable
authenticated notification ofdisposition" to the persons identified in subsection (c). According to
R.U.C.C. § 9-611 (c)( I). the secured party must send the required notification to ..the debtor:' The
new detinition of '"debtor" establishes that the secured creditor. postdefault. must notify all parties
with "an interest. other than a security interest or other lien in the collateral." R.U.C.C. § 9-
102(a)(28). This includes consignees and transferees of the collateral. The secured creditor need
not notify the principal obligor.
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The revisions dredge many safe harbors for the secured creditor
including suggested form notices for public and private sales and a rule
that IO-days notice of a disposition is reasonable. They also provide
some (very modest) assistance to consumer debtors. Creditors must give
consumer debtors a special foreclosure notice9 and a special notice of
deficiency wh ich explains the deficiency.lo
Revised Article 9 also states rules to govern situations old Article
9 never addressed. For example, it posits priority rules for competing
purchase-money security interests and for creditors ofdifferent debtors
regarding transferred collateral. It describes when perfection lapses if
collateral is transferred to an out-of-state transferee, when a til ing officer
can refuse to accept a financing statement, and how a debtor can
counteract a bogus financing statement. The revisions facilitate
electronic filing of financing statements by eliminating the requirement
of the debtor's signature. I I Finally, the revisions reword old Article 9's
occasionally obscure language. 12
Along with the changes in and clarifications ofsubstantive law, the
revisions alter Article 9's character. It is no longer a code but an
elaborate, sometimes but not always interlocking, except-as-otherwise-
provided-for MASS of specific rules seemingly designed to address
every conceivable issue an asset-based financer might confront. 13 (We
know it is not possible to state a rule to govern every situation. What we
don 'f know is why the revisors thought it was or what underlying policy
will help to resolve the inevitable unforeseen situation.)
9. R.U.C.C. § 9-614.
10. R.U.C.C. § 9-616.
II. R.U.C.C. § 9-502.
. 12. Many provisions are restated in much clearer language. e.g.. superpriority for the
Inventory pmsi lender. when a buyer cuts off a security interest. etc.
13. For a discussion ofthis trend in the recent revisions ofother U.c.c. Articles as well. see
Gregory E. Maggs. Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code. 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541 (2000).
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The effects of Revised Article 9 are not limited to state law. 14
Secured creditors take security interests, in large part, to "bankruptcy-
proof' their right to receive payment. Revised Article 9 will have a
significant impact in the federal arena of bankruptcy. Indeed, at least
one author argues that the main engine driving Revised Article 9 was
enhanced bankruptcy protection for secured creditors. IS
14. Attempting to describt; the relationship between state law and the federal law of
bankruptcy sparks the legal imagination. Judge Carol Kenner, United States Bankruptcy Judge for
the District of Massachusetts, refers to state law as "matter" and bankruptcy as ·'anti-matter." We
call bankruptcy ..the magical kingdom:" We warn students that everything they learned in Article
9. bankruptcy will tum upside down. So. for instance. at state law. the Article 9 creditor. indeed
any creditor. has a right to be paid. Bankruptcy inverts that state law right. In bankruptcy. debtors
have a legal right NOT to pay their creditors. II U.S.c. *727(b) (1998). So. too. at state law. if
a debtor defaults. the secured creditor has a right to repossess its collateral if it does not breach the
peace. U.c.c. *9-503. Bankruptcy "stays" that right. Instead ofthe right to repossess. bankruptcy
gives secured creditors a right to "adequate protection:' II U.S.c. ** 363(e). 361 (1998): United
States v. Whiting Pools. 462 U.S. 198.211-212 (1983) ("When property seized prior to the filing
of a petition is drawn into the Chapter II reorganization estate. the Service's tax lien is not
dissolved: nor is its status as a secured creditor destroyed. The IRS. under*363(e). remains entitled
to adequate protection for its interests, to other rights enjoyed by secured creditors. and to the
specific privileges accorded tax collectors. Section 542(a) simply requires the Service to seek
protection ofits interest according to the congressionally establ ished bankruptcy procedures. rather
than by withholding the seized property from the debtor"s efforts to reorganize."). Sometimes. the
creditor's "right" to adequate protection means the debtor gets to use the creditor's collateral for
nothing. But the privilege ofallowing the debtor to use its collateral should be enough to make any
secured party proud to be an American.
15. G. Ray Warner. The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 & Bankruptcy. 9 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3 (200 I). After an exhaustive discussion. Professor Warner concludes:
The bankruptcy-related revisions to Article 9 have both the purpose and
effect ofchanging bankruptcy outcomes. They will neutralize important bankruptcy
avoiding powers and will convert other estate-enhancing powers into tools to
increase the recovery of secured creditors. The revision reallocates reorganization
value from unsecured creditors to secured creditors and gives secured creditors
greater control over the reorganization process. It does all this without a firm basis
of theQretical or empirical support.
The Article 9 revisions are bankruptcy amendments disguised as state law
reforms. They exceed the proper scope of a state uniform revision and violate
bankruptcy policy. Revised Article 9 is an anti-bankruptcy act.
Id. at 84.
According to the Reporters for the Drafting Committee to Revised Uniform Commercial
Code Article 9.
Revised Article 9 and other nonbankruptcy laws allocating property rights (such as
priorities) cannot conflict with bankruptcy policies.
. . . We base our argument on property-related policies inherent in the
Bankruptcy Code. Central to the analysis is the Bankruptcy Code's overarching
respect for nonbankruptcy law's allocation ofrights with respect to particular assets
in which the bankruptcy debtor has an interest. Bankruptcy law gives effect to a
debtor's prebankruptcy transfers of property (including security interests) and
correspondingly. to the rights of the holders ofproperty interests that do not belong
to the debtor. Security interests. like other property interests. benefit from these
policies.
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney. Jr.. Revised Article 9 Meets the Bankruptcy Code: Policy
& Impact. 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85. 87 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
(continued... )
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This Article attempts to describ'e what bankruptcy lawyers and
judges most need to know about Revised Article 9. (Of course, if
bankruptcy judges and lawyers need to know it, a fortiori, secured
creditors' attorneys need to know it.)
At the top of the most-need-to-know list are Revised Article 9's
choice-of-law and filing rules. Section 544(a) ofthe Bankruptcy Code, 16
the "trustee's strong-arm" clause, permits the trustee (and debtor-in-
possession 17) to avoid unperfected security interests. For many
transactions, Revised Article 9's choice-of-law provisions will change
where the creditor must file to perfect its interest. Those who do not
know about Revised Article 9 or more likely, those who do not under-
stand its new choice-of-law rules, will be sitting ducks for the bank-
ruptcy trustee. Avoidance oftheir interests won't even be sporting (but
it wi II be lucrative).
A working knowledge of Revised Article 9's transition rules is
equally important. Many a pre-effective date ("PED") perfected
security interest will shipwreck on the shoals of Revised Article 9's
transition rules. ls These rules are hard to fathom. The PED creditor
who does not understand them, at a minimum, risks preference exposure,
and at a maximum, risks annihilation under Section 544(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Loosely translated, if Revised Article 9 would
require the creditor to file in a different state from that required by old
section 9-103, the PED creditor cannot continue its filed financing
statement by filing a continuation statement in the "old, PED state." To
continue its PED financing statement and maintain its PED priority date,
the creditor must file a special statement, referred to as "an initial
financing statement in lieu ofa continuation statement."19 Moreover, the
creditor must file that special statement according to Revised Article 9's
choice-of-Iaw and filing rules.
15. c. ..continued)
Both arguments have merit. Revised Article 9 does not violate any bankruptcy policy per
se. but ultimately it is going to have a dramatic impact on bankruptcy (assuming meaningful
bankruptcy relief is still available). Revised Article 9 erects few..jf any. hazards on the road to
perfection. Indeed. it has constructed a high speed superhighway. Aller an initial period ofchaos
as the players learn the new rules. taking and perfecting a security interest will be a "cake walk:'
That will translate. in bankruptcy. to fewer unencumbered assets available for distribution to
unsecured creditors or to help fund a debtor's reorganization effort.
16. II U.S.c. § 544 (1998).
17. Id. § II 07(a).
18. Part 7. §§ 9-701 through 9·709.
19. Described in R.U.C.C. § 9-507 and referred to as an "in lieu" statement.
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Many creditors will mistakenly assume that perfecting or re-
perfecting according to the new regime's rules will be enough. It won't
be. It won't preserve the creditor's PED perfection date. If the PED
creditor does not continue its PED financing statement (by filing an "in
lieu" initial financing statement according to the new rules), it will lose
the priority date established by its PED financing statement. Re-
perfection under Revised Article 9 will create a new date oftransfer for
preference analysis purposes.20 Ifthe debtor files bankruptcy within 90
days of the date of the creditor's re-perfection, the interest may
constitute an avoidable preference.21
We predict that chaos will rule the land for the next 10 years or so
as everyone---eourts as well as attorneys-tries to figure out this
behemoth of a statute. During this period, Bankruptcy trustees will
harvest bumper crops of unperfected security interests. At some point
down the road, though, secured creditors and their attorneys will finally
"get it." And when Cousin Vinny masters Revised Article 9, the world
is going to be the secured creditor's oyster - inside and outside bank-
ruptcy. It is going to be as easy as pie to take and perfect an Article 9
security interest in pretty much everything that can't be planted or
plowed. That means few to no assets unencumbered by a perfected
Article 9 security interest and few to no security interests for the
bankruptcy trustee to avoid.
Revised Article 9 represents a new dawn for secured creditors, a
deep abyss for unsecured creditors and a Code odyssey for the rest ofus.
II. CHANGES IN SCOPE & DEFINITION
Revised Article 9 significantly expands the universe of Article 9
transactions, and in doing so, changes Article 9's core concept. It is no
longer a body oflaw regulating consensual interests in personal property
to secure payment or performance of an obligation. Revised Article 9
is not limited to consensual liens. It applies to agricultural statutory
20. For purposes of § 547(b). the "transfer" occurs at the time of perfection. not the time of
attachment of the security interest. if perfection occurs more than 10 days alter attachment. I I
U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B) (1998).
The transition rules are going to trip up many a secured creditor even without the
Bankruptcy wrinkle. The transition rules phase in the new regime over time (June 30. 2006) which
means those searching for outstanding claims must search under both Revised Article 9's choice-of-
law and filing rules and old Article 9's choice-of-Iaw and filing rules.
21. If the transfer occurred within 90 days of bankruptcy. was made while the debtor was
insolvent and constituted an improvement in the creditor's position. the trustee can avoid it unless
the creditor can prove a § 547(c) exception applies.
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liens.22 Moreover, Revised Article 9 is not limited to financing
transactions. It governs true-blue consignments.23 Revised Article 9
also expands its coverage of sales transactions to include sales of
payment intangibles and promissory notes.24 It brings in new forms of
collateral, in particular, commercial deposit accounts,25 and commercial
tort claims.26 Finally, it redefines "account" to include a far broader
class of rights to payment, e.g., health-care-insurance receivables, credit
card receivables, licenses and sales ofreal estate.27
A. AGRICULTURAL LIENS
Revised Article 9 applies to agricultural liens. Revised section 9-
I02(a)(5) defines "agricultural lien" as
an interest, other than a security interest, in farm products:
(A) which secures payment or performance of an obligation for
(i) goods or services furnished in connection with a debtor's
farming operation; or
(ii) rent on real property leased by a debtor in connection with
its farming operation;
(B) which is created by statute in favor ofa person that:
(i) in the ordinary course of its business furnished goods or
services to a debtor in connection with a debtor's farming
operation; or
(ii) leased real property to a debtor in connection with the
debtor's farming operation; and
(C) whose effectiveness does not depend on the person's posses-
sion of the personal property.
Freely translated; Revised Article 9 governs (I) nonpossessory, (2)
statutory liens, (3) that arise in favor of those who, in their ordinary
course of business, provide goods or services, or lease real property, to
debtor-farmers to use in their farming operations.28
22. R.U.C.C. § 9-I08(a)(2).
23. Id. § 9-I08(a)(4).
24. Id. § 9-I09(a)(3).
25. Id. §9-I08(d)(13).
26. Id. § 9-1 08(d)( 12).
27. Id. § 9-1 02(a)(2).
28. The definition of "farm products" includes aquatic goods produced in aquacultural
operations. R.U.C.C. § 9-I02(a)(34).
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Revised Article 9 does not govern the creation of such liens.29 It
does impose a duty on the lien holder to "perfect it" (give public notice)
according to the Article 9 filing rules.30 As a general rule, Revised
Article 9 regulates the priority ofagricultural liens. Because superprior-
ity is limited to purchase-money security interests,3) and an agricultural
lien is not a security interest, agriculturallienors are subject to Article
9's general first-to-file-or-perfect rule.32 .
Does this mean the prior filed Article 9 lender will always have
priority over any and all subsequent agricultural liens even if they are
perfected? Maybe often, but not always. If the statute creating the
agricultural lien gives the lien priority, the lien will have priority ifit is
perfected.33 If the statute giving rise to the lien does not give the
agricultural lien priority, even the perfected agricultural lien will be
subordinate to the prior filed secured lender!34
Can the bankruptcy trustee avoid an agricultural lien if the
Iienholder, as of the commencement ofa bankruptcy case, has fai led to
file a financing statement according to Revised Article 9's rules? Yes.35
An agricultural lien is subordinate to the rights ofa person who becomes
29. Revised Article 9 carefully distinguishes between agricultural liens and security interests.
The rules regarding attachment are limited to security interests. R.U.C.C. § 9-203 (captioned
'"Attachment and Enforceability of Security Interest ...."). Therefore, Article 9 does not govern
creation of an agricultural lien.
30. R.U.C.C. § 9-31 O(a) ('"Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and Section 9-
312(b), a financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests andagricultural liens.").
Id. § 9-50 I(a) ('"ifthe local law ofthis State governs perfection ofa security interest oragricllltural
lien, the office in which to file a financing statement to perfect the sec.urity interest or agricultural
lien is ....").
31. R.U.C.C. §§ 9-103,9-324.
32. Id. § 9-322(a).
33. R.U.C.C. § 9-322(g) ('"A perfected agricultural lien on collateral has priority over a
conflicting security interest in or agricultural lien on the same collateral if the statute creating the
agricultural lien so provides): see also id. cmt. 12.
34. Of course, if the prior secured creditor or indeed. a prior agricultural lienor. is not
perfected, the subsequent perfected agricultural lien will have priority as the first to file.
35. This assertion applies only to agricultural liens that come into existence after Revised
Article 9's effective date. Transactions that occurred pre-effective date (PED) that were not subject
to old Article 9. e.g.. agricultural liens that arose before July 1.2001. can be enforced according to
the law under which they arose. R.U.C.C. § 9-702(b)( I )-(2) n I) ... liens that were not governed
by [former Article 9]. were validly entered into or created before this [Act] takes effect, and would
be subjectlo this [Act] if they had been entered into or created after this [Act] takes effect, and the
rights. duties, and interests flowing from those ... liens remain valid after this [Act] takes effect:
and (2) the ... liens may be terminated, completed, consummated, and enforced as required or
permitted by this [Act] or by the law that otherwise would apply ifthis [Act] had nottaken effect.").
Assume an agricultural supplier, before July 1.2001, obtained a valid and enforceable lien
pursuant to non-Article 9 law. The supplier's lien would be valid. enforceable and unavoidable in
the debtor's subsequent bankruptcy even though the lienor did not perfect according to Revised
Article 9's rules and the debtor filed bankruptcy after July 1.200 I.
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a lien creditor before the lien is perfected according to Revised Article
9.36 At least the revisors were considerate enough to allow agricultural
lienors to file their financing statements in the state where the farm
products are located.37 That state's law also governs the effect of
perfection or nonperfection, and priority.38
B. CONSIGNMENTS
Revised Article 9 also applies to consignments as defined. A
"consignment" is
a transaction ... in which a person delivers goods to a merchant for
the purpose of sale and;
(A) the merchant
(i) deals in goods of that kind under a name other than the
name of the person making delivery;
(ii) is not an auctioneer; and
(iii) is not generally known by its creditors to be substantially
engaged in selling the goods ofothers; ,
(8) with respect to each delivery, the aggregate value of the goods
is $1,000 or more at the time of delivery;
(C) the goods are not consumer goods immediately before delivery;
and
(D) the transaction does not create a security interest that secures an
obligation.
This definition excludes consumer consignments and small commercial
consignments, i.e., deliveries of goods valued at less than $1,000.
Assuming the transaction meets the definition, Revised Article 9
characterizes the consignment as a purchase-money security interest
(pmsi) in a debtor's inventory. The term "security interest" includes the
interest ofa consignor.39 The definition of"pmsi" defines a consignor's
security interest in consigned goods as a pmsi in inventory.4o The
36. R.U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A).
37. Id. § 9-302 ("Law Governing Perfection & Priority ofAgricultural Liens"). The law of
the state where the debtor is located governs perfection of nonpossessory consensual security
interests in larnl products. Id. § 9-30 I( I). This means searchers looking for outstanding claims
against a famler's laml products will need to search in the slate where the goods are located for
agricuhuralliens and in the stale where the debtor is located for consensual liens.
38. Id. § 9-301(3)(C).
39. Proposed Amendment to U.c.c. § 1-201(37).
40. R.U.C.C. § 9-103(d).
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consignor who "perfects" (files a financing statement) protects its
ownership interest from eradication in the consignee-debtor's bank-
ruptcy. The consignor, like any other inventory pmsi creditor, can obtain
superpriority if it files a financing statement before the debtor takes
possession, notifies prior filed inventory claimants, etc., etc.41
Revised Article 9's treatment ofconsignments as pmsi transactions
is limited to the consignor's rights vis-a-vis certain third parties, namely,
creditors ofand buyers from the consignee. Revised Article 9 does not
regulate the relationship between the consignor and consignee or their
respective rights and liabilities.42
In terms ofthird parties, the consignee is deemed to have whatever
rights and title the consignor had or had the power to convey.43 This
legal fiction permits consignees to grant security interests in consigned
goods. By operation of law, the consignee has the rights of the con-
signor. The consignor qua owner ofthe goods has sufficient rights in the
collateral to create a security interest in favor of someone else.44 As
between the consignor and a creditor of the consignee, other law, not
Article 9, determines the parties' respective rights if and only if the
consignor is perfected and would have priority over the creditor.45
Is this change in the treatment ofconsignments significant? In the
grand scheme of things, we think not. Revised Article 9 does create a
much needed consumer-consignor exception and it does shelter small-
potato commercial consignors, but other than that, the change seems
more formal than substantive. Commercial consignors continue to
remain outside the clutches of Article 9 if their consignee is generally
known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods
of others.46 Although commercial consignors lose the right to prove
compliance with a local sign law under Revised Article 9, the loss is de
minibus because today few, if any, sign laws exist,47 Consignors were
41. Id. § 9-324(b).
42. "[T]he rules pertaining to lien creditors. buyers. and attachment, perfection. and priority
of competing security interests apply to consigned goods. The relationship between the consignor
and consignee is left to other law. Consignors also have no duties under Part 6:' Id. § 9-109. cmt.
6.
43. Id. § 9-319(a).
44. R.U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2).
45. Id. § 9-319(b).
46. Id. § 9-102(a)(20)(A)(iii). Compare with U.C.C. § 2-326(3)(b).
47. See U.C.C. § 2·326(a).
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a pretty easy target for bankruptcy trustees under old Article 9.48 They
will remain so under Revised Article 9.
As noted, Revised Article 9 characterizes a consignor as holding
a pmsi in inventory. This means consignors risk subordination to a prior
filed inventory lender unless they comply with the Article 9 rules for
superpriority for pmsis in inventory.49 Complying with these rules may
prove difficult. Filing on ordinary goods is no longer governed by the
law ofthe state where the goods are located. Revised Article 9 requires
creditors to file centrally in the state of the debtor's 10cation,SO which is
the state of incorporation for corporate debtors.sl For corporate debtors
who operate in many states, "there will be mountains offiIings"S2 in the
debtor's "home" state. Many of those filings will claim "all assets."S3
Consequently, "the hassle and expense ofsending notices to prior filers
will be much greater and may not be worth it."s4
C. DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
Former Article 9 recognized an Article 9 creditor's security interest
in a deposit account if the deposit account represented or contained
proceeds of its collateraLss Revised Article 9 continues that rule.s6
Revised Article 9 also permits creditors to take an Article 9 security
interest in deposit accounts as original collateral if the account is not a
consumer account.S7 According to the Official Comments, leaving
deposit accounts to the vagaries of the common law precluded some
debtors from using their deposit accounts as collateral because "the
48. See. e.g., In re TriStar Automotive Group. Inc., 141 B.R. 41 (Bankr. S.D.N. Y. (992)
(holding consignor's interest avoidable because it failed to prove consignor was substantially
engaged in selling goods of others and it did not file).
49. R.U.C.C. § 9-324(b). In this, Revised Anicle 9 simply carries forward the tradition
establ ished by § 9-1 14.
50. Id. § 9-301 (I).
51. Id. §§ 9-307(e), 9-50 I.
52. James L. Dam, Lawyers Scramble to Learn New Rules on Secured Transactions,
LAWYERS WEEKLY USA, January 21,200 I, I, at 20 (quoting Mark Bossi, chair of the American
Bankruptcy Institute's U.C.c. Committee).
53. R.U.C.C. § 9-504(2) validates supergeneric descriptions for financing statements.
54. Dam, supra note 52, at 21, summarizing comments of both Mark Bossi and Professor
Ray Warner.
55. U.C.C. § 9-104(1).
56. Id. § 9-109(d)( 13).
57. Id. § 9-1 09(d)( 13).
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common law is nonuniform, often difficult to discover and comprehend,
and frequently costly to implement."58
Taking and perfecting a security interest in a commercial deposit
account cannot happen serendipitously. The description "general
intangibles" will not capture a debtor's deposit account(s) because
"deposit account" is a separate, discrete type ofcollateral.59 The security
agreement must grant an interest in the debtor's deposit accounts or a
specific deposit account. Moreover, perfection of a security interest in
a deposit account can only occur if the creditor has "control" over it.60
Control only exists if( 1) the secured creditor is the depositary bank; or
(2) the debtor, secured creditor and depositary bank agree that the bank
will follow the creditor's instructions without the debtor's further
consent; or (3) the creditor becomes the depositary bank's customer
regarding the account.61 ,.
Can a depositary bank under Revised Article 9 have both a security
interest in the debtor's account and a right ofset offagainst the account?
In other words, is there a distinction between a security interest and a
right of set off when the depositary bank has loaned the debtor money?
Yes, there is. According to Revised Article 9's enforceability rules, a
security interest in a bank account only attaches if the creditor has
control "pursuant to the debtor's securityagreement."62 A bank's set off
right arises by operation of law without the debtor's agreement or
consent. So, it is possible for one creditor, a bank, to have a security
interest in and a right of set off against a debtor's bank account. One
does not affect or impair the other.63
Revised § 9-327 states priority rules for security interests in
deposit accounts. The Article 9 creditor with control has priority over
the Article 9 creditor without it,64 e.g., the creditor with control over the
account has priority over the creditor claiming the account as proceeds
of its collateral. As a general rule, security interests perfected by control
are ranked according to the time when control was obtained.65 Thus, the
first to obtain control has first priority. But, the security interest of a
58. Id. § 9-109 cmt. 16.
59. Id. § 9-109 cmt. 16.
60. Id. §§ 9-312(b)(I). 9-314(a), 9-104.
61. Id. § 9-104.
62.1d. § 9-203(b)(3)(D).
63. Id. § 9-340 cmt. 3 ("[b]y holding a security interest in a deposit account. a bank does
not impair any right of set-off it would otherwise enjoy,"). '
64. Id. § 9-327( I).
65. Id. § 9-327(b).
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depositary bank as Article 9 creditor has priority over a conflicting
security interest66 unless the competing secured creditor is the bank's
customer of the account.67
What about the conflict between a depositary bank's set off right
and the Article 9 creditor's security interest in the deposit account? The
depositary bank's set off right prevails unless the secured creditor is the
depositary bank's customer vis-a-vis the account.68
Revised Article 9's treatment of security interests in deposit
accounts does not appear to affect banks and their common law rights of
set offand recoupment. The effect, if any there is, lies in permitting the
secured creditor to encumbercollateral that might otherwise be avai lable
to the debtor and/or the debtor's unsecured creditors.69
D. COMMERCIAL TORT CLAIMS
Revised Article 9 makes commercial tort claims available as
Article 9 collateral.7o The definition of "tort claim" includes all tort
claims arising with respect to organizations.7! For individuals, it is
limited to tort claims that arise in the claimant's business or profession
and does not include damages for personal injury or death.72
Commercial tort claims, like deposit accounts, are a separate,
discrete collateral form. Taking a security interest in a debtor's general
intangibles will not capture the debtor's tort c1aim(s). In fact, even a
generic description, a description by type, e.g., "commercial tort claims,"
is insufficient. "[G]reater specificity of description [is required] ... to
prevent debtors from inadvertently encumbering certain property."73
Language that permits the reader to reasonably identify what is
described is sufficient. "Debtor's patent infringement claim against
XYZ Co." is presumably an adequate description.
66. !d. § 9-327(c).
67. !d. § 9-327(4).
68. !d. § 9-340. Unless we are missing something. the depositary bank does not have a right
of set olTin the situation posed and therefore. this priority rule is not necessary. According to the
common law. a rightofset-olTonly exists ifthe parties owe mutual debts, i.e., A owes Band Bowes
A. II'the Article 9 creditor (SP) is the depositary bank's customer. the bank (B) owes its debt to SP,
not the debtor (0). The debts are not mutual. Bowes SP. 0 owes B. Therefore, B has no right of
set ofT against the bank account and SP has "priority" as the only one with a claim to the account.
69. Warner. Anti-Bankruptcy Act. supra note 15, at 45-48.
70. R.U.C.C. § 9-108(d)( 12).
71. !d. §9-102(a)(13).
72. !d. § 9-102(a)(l3)(B).
73. !d. § 9-108. cmt. 5.
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Commercial tort claims are personal property. Revised Article 9,
like former Article 9, governs all consensual security interests in
personal property unless the transaction is excluded. Revised Article 9
simply narrows the exclusion. Revised Article 9 excludes from its
coverage security interests in consumer tort claims and individual
business claims involving damages for death or personal injury.74
What ifa tort claim is settled and the debtor offers its rights under
the settlement as collateral? What is it? It is no longer a claim arising
in tort. It is a "payment intangible,"75 a subset of general intangibles,
more fully described below. The limitations concerning tort claims as
collateral do not appear to carry over to settlement rights.76 Thus, one
supposes a creditor can engage in an Article 9 secured transaction using
a consumer's rights under his/her settlement agreement as collateral.
E. ACCOUNTS
Former Article 9 limited "accounts" to rights to payment for goods
sold or leased or services rendered.77 It classified payment rights
stemming from transactions involving intangibles or real estate as
general intangibles, Article 9's catch-all or residual category ofpersonal
property. Revised Article 9 substantially redefines "account." "Ac-
count" includes rights to payment for any "property sold, leased,
licensed, assigned or otherwise disposed of.'>78 So, a seller's right to
receive payment under a contract to sell real estate is an account under
Revised Article 9. A company's right to receive payments under a
software license is an account. "Account" also includes health-care-
insurance79 and credit card receivables80 as well as rights to receive
74. Id. § 9-1 O9(d)( 12).
75. Id. § 9-1 02(a)(61).
76. Id. § 9-109 cmt. 15 provides:
Note that once a claim arising in tort has been settled and reduced to a contractual
obligation to pay (as in. but not limited to a structured settlement) the right to
payment becomes a payment intangible and ceases to be a claim in tort.
77. U.c.c. § 9-106.
78. R.U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2).
79. R.U.C.C. § 9-10 I. comment4.a., states: "This Article enables a security interestto attach
to ... health-care insurance receivables ... notwithstanding a contractual or statutory prohibition
against or limitation on assignment." This might strike the reader as odd. Exactly how did the
revisors plan to override or get around federal law with Article 9? The answer lies in R.U.C.C. §
9-408. captioned "Restrictions on assignment of promissory notes. health-care-insurance
receivables. and certain general intangibles ineffective." Revised Article 9 separates attachment and
perfection of a security interest in governmental health-care receivables from the
(continued...)
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payment for energy provided (or to be provided),81 insurance policies
issued (or to be issued)82 and lottery winnings,83 The enormous
expansion in the world of accounts under Revised Article 9 causes a
concomitant contraction in its universe of general intangibles,
Despite its expansiveness, the newly reconstituted category of
accounts does not include all rights to payment. Payment rights deriving
from chattel paper, instruments, commercial tort claims, deposit
accounts, investment property and letter-of-credit rights are not
accounts.84 In addition, "rights to payment for money or funds advanced
or sold, other than rights arising out ofthe use ofa credit or charge card
or information contained on or for use with the card," are not accounts.85
So, a bank's right to re-payment of a loan remains a general intangible
under Revised Article 9 as does a tenant's interest in a security deposit
and a borrower's interest in an escrow account.
Why did the revisors choose to define "accounts" so broadly?
Presumably to make its potpourri ofpayment rights subject to the Article
9 rules regarding accounts. Whether a transaction in accounts is a sale
or a secured transaction, Article 9 govems.86 The Article 9 formalities
for attachment and perfection apply. The accounts buyer as well as the
accounts lender must give public notice of its claim. It must file an
Article 9 financing statement. If the accounts buyer fails to file, its
ownership claim is not effective against third parties including the
bankruptcy trustee. So, buyers of lottery winnings, credit card receiv-
79. (...continued)
govemmentlaccount-debtor's obligation to pay and other issues. According to Revised Article 9,
restrictions on or prohibitions against assignments or security interests are ineffective to: ( I) impair
the creation and/or perfection ofa security interest in a health-care receivable; (2) establish a debtor
default; or (3) give the account debtor a right to terminate its contract with the debtor. R.U.C.C.
§ 9-408(a)-(b). R.U.C.C. § 9-408(d) spells out R.U.C.C. § 408(a)'s limited effect. For instance,
it does not entitle the secured creditor to enforce the security interest. R.U.C.C. § 9-408(d)(6). The
creditor's security interest is "not enforceable against . .. the account debtor," R.U.C.C. § 9-
408(d)( I) [emphasis added], and does not impose a duty or obligation on the account debtor.
R.U.C.C. § 9-408(d)(2). These provisions are intended to "enhanceD the ability ofcertain debtors
to obtain credit .... [S]ubsection (d) protects the other party ... from adverse effects arising from
the security interest:' R.U.C.C. § 9-408 cmt. 2.
Revised Article 9 provides similar treatment for licenses. It separates a creditor's right to
take and perfect an security interest in a license from the State's public-protection/fee collection
function. See R.U.C.C. § 9-408.
80. R.U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2)(vii).
81. Id. § 9-1 02(a)(2)(v).
82. Id. § 9-102(a)(2)(iii).
83. Id. § 9-1 02(a)(2)(viii).
84. Id. § 9-102(a)(2)(i)-(v).
85. Id. § 9-1 02(a)(2)(vi).
86. U.c.c. § 9-102(a)(2); R.U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3).
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ables, most health-care receivables,87 etc., etc., must give public notice
of their ownership claims by filing an Article 9 financing statement. If
they do not, they risk losing their ownership interest in the seller's
subsequent bankruptcy.
Revised Article 9 also resolves the logical tangle created by
treating sales ofaccounts (and chattel paper) as secured transactions and
defining "security interest" to include "any interest of a buyer of
accounts or chattel paper which is subject to Article 9."88 Revised
Article 9 expressly establishes that a person who sells accounts (or
chattel paper, promissory notes and payment intangibles) does not retain
a legal or equitable interest in the property sold. If the seller subse-
quently files bankruptcy, the accounts (chattel paper, etc.) do not become
property of the seller's bankruptcy estate.89
What if the buyer does not give the requisite notice of its owner-
ship interest by an Article 9 filing? The buyer's failure to "perfect" is
limited to its rights vis-a-vis creditors of and purchasers for value from
the debtor-seller:
For purposes ofdetermining the rights ofcreditors of, and purchas-
ers for value of an account or chattel paper from, a debtor that has
sold an account or chattel paper, while the buyer's security interest
is unperfected, the debtor is deemed to have rights and title to the
account or chattel paper identical to those the debtor sold.90
87. Assignments to the health care provider, i.e., patient to doctor, patient to hospital, are
automatically perfected. R.U.C.C. § 9-309(5) (automatic perfection for security interests created
by assignment ofhealth-care-insurance receivable to providerofhealth-care goods or services). The
normal rules regarding accounts govern other assignments of health-care receivables. e.g., from
provider to lender. R.U.C.C. § 9-309, comment 5, explains:
Paragraph 5 extends automatic perfection to assignments of health-care-insurance
receivables if the assignment is made to the health-care provider that provided the
health-care goods or services. The primary effect is that. when an individual assigns
a right to payment under an insurance policy to the person who provided the health-
care goods or services. the provider has no need to file a financing statement against
the individual. The normal filing requirements apply to other assignments ofhealth-
care-insurance receivables covered by this Article. e.g.• assignments from the health-
care provider to a financer.
88. U.c.c. § 1-201(37).
89. R.U.C.C. § 9-318(a) ("A debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment
intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the collateral sold.").
One supposes that R.U.C.C. § 9·318(a) is an attempt to override cases like Octagon Gas Sys., Inc.
v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948. 957 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 993 (1993)to make the world safe
for securitization and bankruptcy-remote vehicles. Ofcourse, ifthe buyer fails to give public notice
of its ownership claim, the trustee can avoid the buyer's interest and the property will become
property of the debtor-seller's estate. II U.S.c. §§ 544(a), 541(a)(3) (1998).
90. R.U.C.C. § 9-318(b).
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So, Revised Article 9 attempts to insulate properly filed buyers of such
property from their debtor-seller's bankruptcies.
Revised Article 9 applies to sales ofpromissory notes and payment
intangibles as well as to sales of accounts and chattel paper. Revised
Article 9 brings such sales within its scope only to provide for their
automatic perfection.91 What's going on?
The apparent effect of bringing a sale ofa promissory note within
Revised Article 9 and then allowing for automatic perfection ofthe
sale is that the interest of the buyer ofa negotiable note is good as
against the creditors of the seller even though the seller still has
possession. There is neither public notice nor a change in posses-
sion to alert third parties that the seller is no longer the owner ofthe
note it still possesses. The seller's trustee in bankruptcy cannot
avoid the sale under Section 544(a) ... because state law lien
creditors do not have priority over the buyer under Revised Article
9. Secret interests are allowed to facilitate securitization of the
notes.n
Ultimately, the success ofthis "bankruptcy-proofing" strategy will tum
on two things: I) the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the transaction
in question represents a true, real, honest-to-goodness sale; and 2) the
Bankruptcy Court's willingness to defer to state law to determine the
nature of a debtor's property interest,93 Only time will tell.
F. GENERAL INTANGIBLES
Along with decreasing, by legislative fiat, the kinds of personal
property inhabiting the world of general intangibles, Revised Article 9
carves out a subcategory of general intangible-the "payment intangi-
ble." "Payment intangible means a general intangible under which the
account debtor's principal obi igation is a monetary obi igation."94 So, the
91. Id. § 9-309(3). (4).
92. JULIAN B. McDONNELL. UNIFORM COMMER('fALCODE ANALYSIS OF REVISED ARTICLE
9. § 9-309. at 175 (Lexis 1999). The same holds true for sales of payment intangibles.
93. Although bankruptcy courts often defer to state law to characterize a debtor's property
interests or lack thereof. they should not do so ifa federal interest requires a different result. Butner
v. United States. 40 U.S. 48, 55 (1971). At an oral presentation. Judge William C. Hillman. off the
cuff. described special purpose vehicles. bankruptcy remote entities, etc.. as an attempt to "opt out
of bankruptcy." Revised Article 9 creates the formalities for exercising such an opt out right.
Whether it is recognized in bankruptcy is another matter.
94. R.U.C.C. § 9-1 02(a)(61).
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bank's or credit union's right to receive repayment from a borrower
qualifies as a payment intangible. Settlement of a tort claim that gives
rise to a right to payment is a payment intangible.95 Revised Article 9
segregates payment intangibles from other general intangibles so it can
provide special treatment for this category of payment rights and
promissory notes.
G. EXPANSION OF SALES COVERAGE
As noted, Revised Article 9 governs sales ofpromissory notes and
payment intangibles in addition to sales of accounts and chattel paper.
Unlike sales of accounts and chattel paper, however, sales of payment
intangibles and sales of promissory notes are not subject to the Article
9 formality of public notice, the filing of a financing statement. The
buyer's interest perfects automatically.96 Revised U.e.e. section 9-309,'
Official Comment 4, "explains" that automatic perfection of sales of
notes and payment intangibles reflects the practice under former Article
9: "filing a financing statement did not affect the rights of a buyer of
payment intangibles or promissory notes, inasmuch as the former Article
did not cover those sales." (?!) Why bring transactions into Article 9
only to exempt them from Article 9's public notice rules? That's easy.
"The revisers were not interested in giving public notice of [such] sales,
but in assuring that a sale could not be undone by a trustee in bank-
ruptcy."97 And, of course, protecting such sales from avoidance in
bankruptcy assists in the attempt to create "bankruptcy remote" entities.
95. Id. § 9-109 cm!. 15.
96. Id. § 9-309(4). Although not expressly stated, one supposes the buyer must nevenheless
comply with R.U.e.C. § 9-203's attachment formalities. Proposed Amendment to § 1-201(37)
defines "security interest'" to include "any interest of a ... buyer of ... a payment intangible, or a
promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9." A security interest does not exist
unless it attaches. Attachment only occurs if the requirements ofR.U.e.e. § 9-203 are satisfied.
Therefore, it would appear that the buyer of promissory notes or payment intangibles needs to
comply with R.U.e.e. § 9-203 to have a legally recognized ownership interest in the notes or
payment intangibles. The absence ofa record ofan agreement or more likely, a faulty description
might permit the bankruptcy trustee to invalidate the buyer's ownership claim.
97. McDONNELL, supra nole 92, § 9·109. at 100 (Lexis 1999).
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H. GOVERNMENT AS DEBTOR
Revised Article 9 significantly narrows the exclusion for govern-
ments-as-borrowers.98 It subjects transfers by governmental debtors to
the Article 9 rules unless another statute regulates the specific issue
raised.99
III. CHOICE-Of-LAW RULES
A. CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES GENERALLY
Revised Article 9's most striking change is probably its reformula-
tion of the Article 9 choice-of-Iaw rules. These rules, described in
sections 9-30 I through 9-307, state which jurisdiction's law governs
three issues: I) perfection, 2) the effect of perfection or nonperfection,
and 3) the priority ofsecurity interests. lOo Both the statutory text and its
comments are very clear about the precise scope of Revised Article 9's
choice-of-Iaw rules. They govern priority issues as well as questions of
perfection. Moreover, the term "priority" includes the "cut off' and
"take free" rules. 101 These choice-of-Iaw provisions do not govern other
issues, e.g., whose law governs the validity of a repossession, whether
a transaction is a lease or security interest, whether the debtor intended
to create a security interest, whether the debtor has rights in the
collateral, whether the security agreement properly described the
.collateral, etc., etc. 102 Revised Article 9's choice-of-Iaw rules apply to
and are limited to "perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection,
98. R.U.C.C. § 9-109(c)(2)-(3).
99. Id. at cmt. 9.
100. Id. § 9-30 I cmt. 2.
101. R.U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt. 2 ('This Article follows ... [a] broader and more precise
formulation ... : perfection, the effect of perfection or non-perfection. and the priority of security
interest. Priority, in this context. subsumes all ofthe rules in Part 3. including 'cut ofT' or 'take free'
rules ... .'').
102. They do not govern other choice-of-Iaw issues, for example, "attachment, validity,
characterization (e.g., true lease or security interest), and enforcement ... ." R.U.C.C. § 9-301.
cmt. 2. Current § 1-105 recognizes party autonomy regarding those choice-of-Iaw issues so long
as the chosen state bears some reasonable relationship to the transaction.
R.U.C.C. § 9-40 I and its comments identify yet a third c1usterofissues involving choice-of-
law questions. viz.. "the rights and duties of account debtors and other persons obligated on
collateral who are not, themselves. parties to a secured transaction'" Id. § 9-342 cmt. 2. For
instance, whose law governs whether a restriction on assignment is enforceable? "This Article does
not provide a specific answer to the question ...... Id. at cmt. 3.
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and the priority of security interests ...."103 Beware: Sometimes, one
state's law wi II govern peifection whiIe another state's law wi II govern
the effect ofperfection or nonpeifection andpriority.
For many, many transactions, the change in choice-of-Iaw rules
will change the state in which the creditor must file to perfect its interest.
As a result, Revised Article 9 will require many, many "pre-existing"
(pre-effective date or "PED") secured creditors to do something to
maintain their perfected status under the new regime. This change in the
law will undoubtedly provide bankruptcy trustees with a steady supply
of unperfected security interests for years to come.
By way ofoverview,l04 revised V.e.C. section 9-301 states Revised
Article 9's basic choice-of-Iaw rules. Revised V.e.e. sections 9-302
through 9-306 state exceptions-special rules for specific types of
collateral ("specialty collateral"), e.g., goods covered by a certificate of
title,105 agricultural liens, 106 deposit accounts,107 investment property, 108
and letter-of-credit rights. 1M
Generally, Revised Article 9 holds that the law of the state where
the debtor is located governs all three issues-perfection, the effect of
perfection or nonperfection, and priority. I 10 Revised V.C.e. section 9-
307 defines where a debtor is located. In terms of which state's law
governs how the creditorperfects its interest, there is only one exception
to this basic rule. The exception relates to possessory security interests.
Because a possessory security interest can only exist in tangible
collateral, i.e., collateral capable of being possessed, this choice-of-Iaw
exception only applies to goods, negotiable documents, instruments,
103. In most cases, the effect of non-perfection is a loss of priority, but one supposes the
opposite is not true, necessitating Revised Article 9's more precise formulation.
104. Traveler's advisory: in some sense, the whole discussion here is an overview. It
attempts to simplify the rules without being inaccurate. Figuring out the basic choice-of-Iaw rules
is complicated enough. We leave to the reader the task of sorting through the complexities of
choice-of-Iaw rules for investment property, letter-of-credit rights and other specialty collateral.
105. R.U.C.C. § 9-303. The local law ofthe jurisdiction under whose certificate oftitle the
goods are covered controls. !d. § 9·303(c).
106. !d. § 9-302 (local law of jurisdiction where farm products are located governs
perfection. the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority). As Professor McDonnell points
out, searchers looking for outstanding claims to farm products will have to search the files of two
states. They will have to look for agricultural liens in the state where the farm products are located.
They will have to search for security interests in the state where the debtor is located. McDONNELL,
supra note 92, § 9-301, at 147.
107. According to R.U.C.C. § 9-304, the law ofthe bank'sjurisdiction governs perfection,
the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority.
108. !d. § 9-305.
109. !d. § 9-306.
110. !d. § 9-301 (1).
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money, and tangible chattel paper. If the creditor wants to perfect its
interest by possessing the collateral, a situs of the collateral rule
controls. The law of the state where the collateral is governs
perfection. I I I That same state also governs the effect of perfection or
non-perfection, and priority. 112
What about nonpossessory security interests in tangible collateral?
Here, Revised Article 9 distinguishes between the law governing how
the creditor perfects and the law governing the effect of perfection or
nonperfection, and priority. For nonpossessory security interests in
tangible collateral, the law of the state where the debtor IS located
controls peifection. The law ofthe state where the collateral is located
governs the effect ofperfection or nonpeifection, andpriority. 113
The above rules are tricky. Be careful. Said another way,
• For intangible collateral, the law of the state of the debtor's
location governs all three choice-of-Iaw issues - how to perfect, the
effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority.
• For tangible collateral (goods, instruments, negotiable docu-
ments, tangible chattel paper), 114 you must distinguish between posses-
sory and nonpossessory security interests.
• For possessory security interests in tangible collateral, the law
of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located governs all three
choice-of-Iaw issues - perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfec-
tion, and priority. 115
• For nonpossessory security interests in tangible collateral,
a the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor is located
governs perfection (this is Revised Article 9's basic choice-
of-law ru Ie but limited to where and how to perfect other than
by possession)
III. Id. § 9-301(2).
112. Id. § 9-301(2).
113. Id. § 9-301 (3)(C).
114. As opposed to electronic chattel paper. R.U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(II). the technology for
which has yet to be invented.
115. Id. § 9-30 I(2).
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a the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located
governs the effect of perfection or non-perfection, and
priority. 116
So, Revised Article 9's basic choice-of-Iaw rules distinguish between
tangible and intangible collateral, and within the category of tangible
collateral, the rules distinguish between possessory and nonpossessory
security interests. With the exception of possessory security interests
(obviously in tangible collateral), the law of the state of the debtor's
location governs where and how the creditor perfects.
Crystallizing the basic rules to their essence,
• For intangible collateral, the law ofthe debtor's location governs
all three choice-of-Iaw issues - perfection, the effect of perfection
or nonperfection, and priority.
• For possessory security interests, the law where the collateral is
located governs all three choice-of-Iaw issues - perfection, the
effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority.
• For nonpossessory security interests in tangible collateral, the
law of the debtor's state of location governs perfection. The law
where the collateral is located governs the effect of perfection or
nonperfection, and priority.
B. WHERE Is A DEBTOR LOCATED?
Because most creditors will file a financing statement to perfect
their interest in collateral, most creditors will need to file their financing
statements according to the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor's
location.
Where is a debtor located? Revised section 9-307 addresses that
key issue. It defines the debtor's state of location based on the debtor's
status. Revised Article 9 distinguishes between human being-debtors
and organization-debtors. "Person" includes individuals and organiza-
tions. 117 An individual is a human being. An organization is either a
116. Id. § 9-301(3)(C).
117. U.c.c. § 1-201(30).
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registered organization or an organization that does not meet the
defin ition of "registered organ ization."
A "registered organization" is "an organization organized solely
under the law of a single State or the United States and as to which the
State or the United States must maintain a public record showing the
organization to have been organized."118 Corporations, limited partner-
ships and limited liability companies are registered organizations. With
respect to registered organizations, the phrase ''jurisdiction oforganiza-
tion" refers to the law under which the organization organized - i.e., the
law of the state where the corporation incorporated or the limited
partnership organized. I 19 General partnerships, informal partnerships,
are not registered organizations. 12o
Under Revised Article 9, then, a debtor is (must be) one of three
things:
• an individual,
• a registered organization, or
• a business entity t.hat is not a registered organization.
Where are these various types of debtors located?
• An individual debtor is located at the individual's principal
residence. 121 This is so whether the individual debtor is granting
a security interest in consumer or business assets.
Therefore, for nonpossessory security interests in any kind ofcollateral,
the law of the state in which the individual debtor has his or her
principal residence governs perfection.
• A registered organization is located in the state under whose
laws it organized. 122 So, corporate debtors are located in the state
oftheir incorporation. Limited partnerships are located in the state
where they organized.
118. R.U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(70).
119. /d. § 9-102(a)(50). "'State' means a State of the United States. the District of
Columbia. Puerto Rico. the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."/d. § 9-102(a)(76).
120. Id. § 9-102(a)(70) & cmt. I\.
12\. Id. § 9-307(b)(I).
122. Id. § 9-307(b)(e).
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Therefore, the law of the state in which the registered organization
organized governs perfection ofnonpossessory security interests in any
kind of collateral.
• All other business entitIes ("organizations"), in particular,
infonnal partnerships, are located in the state in which they have
their place of business,123 or if they have more than one place of
business, in the state in which they have their chief executive
office. 124
This carries forward old § 9-1 03(3)'s definition of where-a-debtor-is-
located but limits its application to nonregistered organizations. So, if
the debtor-business entity is not a registered organization, the debtor is
located in the state in which it has its place of business. If it has more
than one place ofbusiness, it is located in the state of its chiefexecutive
office. Therefore, for nonpossessory security interests in any kind of
collateral, the law of the state in which the nonregistered organization-
debtor has its place of business or chief executive office governs
perfection.
Revised Article 9's choice-of-Iaw rules and definitions regarding
where a debtor is located will reduce the need for creditors to "paper the
countryside" when they do their initial filings. It will also reduce the
need to re-perfect after the initial filing. Debtors relocate their principal
residence, place of business or chief executive office, less often than
collateral moves across state lines. Moreover, a registered organiza-
tion's state of location will remain constant despite its suspension,
revocation, dissolution, cancellation, etc. 125
Revised Article 9 significantly reduces both the hazards and risks
of initial filings and the need to re-perfect postfiling. That reduction
translates into reduced exposure for security interests in bankruptcy.
Putting sections 9-307 and 9-30 I together, what do we have?
Perfection ofnonpossessory security interests
Creditors of corporate and limited liability partnership debtors
must file or otherwise perfect (e.g., automatic perfection) according to
123. Id. § 9-307(b)(2).
124. Id. § 9-307(b)(3).
125. Id. § 9-307(g).
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the law of the debtor's state of organization for all nonpossessory
security interests. .
Cr~ditors of individual debtors seeking to perfect nonpossessory
securityiinterests must file or otherwise perfect according to the law of
the state in which the debtor has his or her principal residence. If the
debtor has residences in more than one state, the prudent creditor will
comply with the perfection laws of both states.
To perfect any nonpossessory security interest, creditors of a
nonregistered organization-debtor must file or otherwise perfect
according to the law of the state in which the debtor has its place of
business, or its chief executive office if it has more than one place of
business. Ifambiguity exists as to which place ofbusiness represents the
debtor's chiefexecutive office, the prudent creditor will comply with the
perfection laws ofall states in which the debtor's chiefexecutive office
may exist.
The debtor's state of location is irrelevant to perfect a security
interest by possession. For possessory security interests, creditors must
comply with the law of the state in which the collateral is located.
What about the choice-of-Iaw rules regarding the effect of
perfection or nonperfection, andpriority?
For tangible collateral (negotiable documents, goods, instruments,
money and tangible chattel paper):
• the law where the collateral is located controls the effect of
perfection, nonperfection and priority.
for intangible collateral:
• the law of the debtor's location controls these issues.
Example: Debtor, Inc. incorporated under the laws of State
A. Debtor has places of business in States B, C and D.
Debtor's chief executive office is in State B. Debtor grants
Bank a security interest in its accounts and tangible chattel
paper. The chattel paper in question is located in State C.
Bank wants to file to perfect its interest in both Debtor's
chattel paper and accounts.
Bank must perfect its (nonpossessory) security interest in
both the accounts and chattel paper according to the law of
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State A. State A is Debtor, Inc.'s state of incorporation and'
the state where Debtor, Inc. is deemed to be located. '26
If any issue regarding Bank's perfection or nonperfection or
priority arises as to the accounts, State A's law governs. 127
If any issue regarding Bank's perfection or nonperfection, or
priority arises as to the chattel paper, State C's law states the
choice-of-Iaw rules because the chattel paper is tangible collateral
and the law ofthe state where the collateral is governs the effect of
perfection or nonperfection, and priority regarding tangible
collateral. 128
a Same basic facts except Debtor is an individual, sole
proprietor, and Debtor resides in State E.
Bank must perfect its interest in both the accounts and chattel
paper according to the law of State E, the state of Debtor's
principal residence and the state where D is deemed to be
located. 129
If any issue regarding Bank's perfection or nonperfection or
priority arises as to the accounts, State E's law governs. 130
If any issue regarding Bank's perfection or nonperfection or
priority arises as to the chattel paper, State C's law states the
choice-of-Iaw rules because the chattel paper is tangible collateral
and the law ofthe state where the collateral is governs the effect of
perfection or nonperfection and priority' regarding tangible
collateral. 13 1
126. R.U.C.C. § 9-301(1). 9-307(e).
127. Id. § 9-301(1).
128. Id. § 9-301 (3)(C).
129. Id. §§ 9-301(1), 9-307(b)(I).
130. Id. § 9-301(1).
131. Id. § 9-301(3)(C).
NO.2 ODYSSEY FOR ARTICLE 9 SECURED CREDITOR 131
a Same basic facts except Debtor is a informal general
partnership.
Bank must perfect its interest in both the accounts and chattel
paper according to the law ofState B, the state ofthe partnership's
chief executive office. 132
If any issue regarding Bank's perfection or nonperfection or
priority arises as to the accounts, State B's law governs. 133
If any issue regarding Bank's perfection or nonperfection or
priority arises as to the chattel paper, State C's law states the
choice-of-Iaw rules because the chattel paper is tangible collateral
and the law ofthe state where the collateral is governs the effect of
perfection or nonperfection and priority regarding tangible
collateral. 134
• What ifDebtor is an individual and grants a purchase money
security interest in an entertainment system for use in her
home?
For nonpossessory security interests, the law of the state of the
debtor's principal residence controls perfection (filing orautomatic
perfection if recognized).
For possessory security interests, the law of the state where the
collateral is governs perfection.
For both possessory and nonpossessory security interests, the law
of the state where the collateral is will govern the effect of
perfection or nonperfection and priority.
With consumer goods, often, but not always, the debtor's state of
principal residence and the state where the goods are located will
be the same.
132. !d. §§ 9-301( I), 9-307(b)(3).
133. !d. § 9-301(1).
134. !d. § 9-301 (3)(C).
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C. FURTHER COMMENTS ON REVISED ARTICLE 9's CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
l. Official Comment 3 to revised section 9-301 cautions that the
substantive law of the debtor's location, not its choice-of-Iaw rules,
controls. This seeks to head offcolossal problems if Revised Article 9
is not effective in all states as of July 1, 2001. 135 Whatever problems
there are in this vein will be caused by the states who delayed Revised
Article 9's effective date beyond July 1,2001. The problems will be
shared by all the states and the District of Columbia.
2. In this world ofglobalization, what are the rules regarding foreign
corporations as debtors? First, a foreign corporation is not a registered
organization. The definition of "registered organization" is limited to
organizations organized solely under the law of a single State or the
United States, 136 and "State" is limited to a state of the United States or
territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. 137 Second, revised U.C.C. section 9-307(c) addresses where a
foreign debtor is located.
The rules stated in revised U.C.C. section 9-307(b), e.g., an
individual is located where hislher principal residence is located, an
organization at its chief executive office, etc., etc., apply to foreign
debtors ifthey are
135. Official Comment 3 amplifies the point.
Example 1: Litigation over the priority of a security interest in accounts
arises in State X. State X has adopted the official text ofthis Article, which provides
that priority is determined by the local law ofthe jurisdiction in which the debtor is
located.... The debtor is located in State Y. Even if State Y has retained former
Article 9 or enacted a nonuniform choice-of-Iaw rule (e.g., one that provides that
perfection is governed by the law ofState Z), a State X court should look only to the
substantive law of State Y and disregard State Y's choice-of-Iaw rule. State Y's
substantive law ... provides that financing statements should be filed in a filing
office in State Y. Note, however, that ifthe identical perfection issue were to be
litigated in State Y, the court would look to State Y's former Section 9·103 or
nonuniform 9-30 I and conclude that a filing in State Y is ineffective.
Example 2: In the preceding Example, assume that State X has adopted the
official text of this Article, and State Y has adopted a nonuniform Section 9·301 (I)
under which perfection is governed by the whole law of State X, including its
choice-of-Iaw rules. If litigation occurs in State X, the court should look to the
substantive law ofState Y, which provides that financing statements are to be filed
in a filing office in State Y. Iflitigation occurs in State Y, the court should look to
the law of State X, whose choice-of-Iaw rule requires that the court apply the
substantive law of State Y. Thus, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the
litigation arises. the financing statement should be filed in State Y.
136. R.U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(70).
137. Id. § 9-102(a)(76).
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located in ajurisdiction whose law generally requires information
concerning the existence ofa nonpossessory security interest to be
made generally available in a filing, recording, or registration
system as a condition or result of the security interest's obtaining
priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the
colIateral. 138
, If the foreign debtor is not located in such a jurisdiction, the debtor is
located in the District of Columbia. 139
D. POSTFILING CHANGE IN GOVERNING LAW
What if the debtor relocates postfiling (understanding that
registered organizations can never relocate although they can merge)?
Revised U.C.C. section 9-316, captioned "Continued Perfection of
Security Interest following Change in Governing Law," addresses that
issue. It restates a familiar rule. "A security interest perfected pursuant
to the law ofthe jurisdiction designated in Section 9-30 I(I) ... remains
perfected until" the earlier ofexpiration ofperfection in that jurisdiction
or four months after "a change in the debtor's location to another
jurisdiction ...."140 If the creditor re-perfects according to the law of
the debtor's new location before its perfection expires under subsection
(a), the creditor's interest remains continuously perfected. 141 Assume D,
an informal partnership, relocates its chief executive office from State
I to State 2. C, a secured creditor, had properly filed on D's accounts in
State 1. C's financing statement in State 1 has more than 4 months of
life left to it. 142 C has 4 months to re-perfect according to State 2's laws
to maintain uninterrupted perfection and a priority date based on its
initial filing in State 1. 143
138. Jd. § 9-307(c).
139. Jd. § 9-307(c).
140. Jd. § 9-316(a)(I)-(2).
141. Jd. § 9-316(b).
142. The creditor will have less than 4 months to act in State B if its financing statement
filed in State A will lapse in less than 4 months. Of course. the creditor can always file a
continuation statement in State A to acquire the full 4 month period to re-perfect in State B.
R.U.C.C. §§ 9-5 I5.9-5 12(a).
143. Jd. § 9-322(a)(I) CPriority dates from the earlier of the time a filing covering the
collateral is first made or the security interest or agricultural Iien is first perfected. if there is no
period thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection"),
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Using the basic facts above, assume C does not re-perfect its
interest in State 2. What is the status ofC's interest 6 months after D's
relocation to State 2?
According to revised section 9-316(b), "[i]f the security interest
does not become perfected under the law ofthe otherjurisdiction before
the earliest time or event [described in (a)], it becomes unperfected and
is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the
collateral for value." Like former Article 9, the consequences of a
failure to re-perfect in State 2 are two-fold. First, C's perfection lapses
prospectively. This means that as against those who come on the scene
after C's lapse in perfection, C is unperfected. Ifthe post-lapse party in
competition with C would prevail over an unperfected creditor, it
prevails over C. 144 Second, upon lapse, C is deemed retroactively
unperfected vis-a-vis purchasers of the collateral for value who
intervened during C's 4-month period of automatic, continuous
perfection in State 2. 145
Assume ajudgment creditor (JC) of D who obtains a lien on D's
assets in State 2 within 4 months of D's relocation there. Who would
have priority, C or JC? JC's lien would remain subordinate to C's
interest even though C subsequently let its perfection lapse. C would
have priority. A judgment lien creditor is not a purchaser.
What if D petitioned for bankruptcy relief during the 4-month
period and thereafter C forgot to re-perfect in State 2? First, the
bankruptcy trustee could not avoid C's interest under section 544(a).
Revised U.C.C. section 9-3 I6's retroactively-deemed-unperfected rule
is limited to purchasers for value, i.e., those who take their interest by
voluntary transaction. l46 The bankruptcy trustee is a lien creditor. 147
Lien creditors take their interests involuntarily. C would be perfected as
of the commencement of the bankruptcy case and therefore immune
from sectibn 544(a) strong-arm attack. (If D filed bankruptcy in month
6 and C had failed to reperfect in State 2, C would be unperfected and
its interest avoidable under Section 544(a).)
According to the comments, deeming the creditor retroactively
unperfected as against a lien creditor "would create substantial and
144. Most competing creditors prevail over an unperfected secured creditor. R.U.C.C. § 9-
317. Unsecured creditors do not. Id. §§ 9-317, 9-201.
145. R.U.C.C. § 9-316(e).
146. U.c.c. § 1-201(32).
147. R.U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(52)(C).
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unjustifiable preference risks."'48 What are the revisors talking about?
They don't bother to explain but perhaps they were thinking as follows.
Assume the same basic facts as stated above. D petitions for
bankruptcy relief in State 2 within C's 4-month period of automatic,
continuous perfection based on its State I filing. Postpetition, C does
not reperfect in State 2. If the retroactive unperfection rule applied to
lien creditors, C would be deemed unperfected as ofthe commencement
of D's case. According to II U.S.c. § 547(e)(2)(C), ifa creditor is not
perfected at the commencement of a case, the creditor is deemed
perfected "immediately before the date of the filing." Because C's
"deemed perfection" would occur more than 10 days after attachment of
the security interest, the date ofC's "deemed perfection" (immediately
before the bankruptcy filing) would be the date of the transfer for
purposes ofa preference analysis. 149 And that would make C's security
interest an avoidable preference. The interest would be a transfer to C
on account of an antecedent debt made within 90 days of bankruptcy
which improved C's position. ISO By excluding lien creditors from the
class ofbeneficiaries ofthe retroactive unperfection rule, revised section
9-316(e) eliminates this preference risk. 151
Revised section 9-316(a)(3) also deals with an issue former Article
9 does not address. Assume Debtor transfers collateral. The transfer
does not cut off the security interest. Under old and new Article 9, the
creditor's (C's) filed financing statement under Debtor's, the trans-
feror's, name continues to perfect C's interest even though the collateral
is now owned by Transferee. ls2 But what if Transferee (Debtor 2)153
changes its state of location or Debtor I sells to Buyer-Debtor 2 who is
148. ld. § 9-316 cmt. 3.
149. II U.S.c. § 547(e)(2)(B) (a transfer is deemed to take place at the time of perfection
if perfection occurs more than 10 days after the transfer).
150. ld. § 547(b).
151. A postfiling change in the state ofthe debtor's location does create one preference risk.
Assume D relocates to State 2 and C only gets around to reperfecting in State 2 in month 8. Within
90 days of C"S reperfection, D petitions for bankruptcy relief. Because C did not file in State 2
within 4 months of D's relocation to State 2, C"s perfection lapsed. C's filing in State 2 in month
8 establishes a new perfection date for C. C's filing in month 8 in State 2 also establishes a new
date of transfer for preference purposes. II U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B) (1998) (a transfer is deemed to
take place at the time of perfection if perfection occurs more than 10 days after the transfer).
Assuming all the other § 547(b) requirements are met. C's security interest constitutes a preference.
Thus, the creditor who fails to reperfect in State 2 within the requisite period of time creates
preference exposure. Revised Article 9 significantly reduces this preference exposure by reducing
the number of situations in which a postfiling change will trigger a need to refile.
152. U.C.C. § 9-402(7): R.U.C.C. § 9-507(a).
153. Remember "debtor" means owner of the collateral, not the person indebted if they are
different.
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located in another state? According to revised section 9-316(a)(3), C's
security interest remains perfected until "the expiration ofone year after
a transfer of collateral to a person that thereby becomes a debtor and is
located in another jurisdiction." Therefore, Revised Article 9 gives C a
year to find out about the transfer and to re-perfect according to the law
of Debtor 2's state of location. 154 But C is not told how it should "re-
perfect" in State 2. Is C required to file a financing statement under
Debtor I's name or Debtor 2's name? If Debtor I's name, what's the
point? It does not give meaningful notice to those searching for interests
on Debtor 2's assets and who would be searching in State 2 for
outstanding claims on Debtor I's assets? If C is required to file a
financing statement listing Debtor 2 as debtor, what leverage does C
have? Will Debtor I 's authorization to C to file a financing statement
extend to Debtor 2?
Assume C does not act and Debtor 2 files bankruptcy within C's
one-year automatic continuous perfection in State 2. Can Debtor 2's
bankruptcy trustee avoid C's interest? No, for very the same reasons the
trustee could not avoid C's interest when its debtor changed its state of
location. ISS What if Debtor 2 files bankruptcy more than a year later?
Now C is unperfected and its interest avoidable under Section 544(a).
E. CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES FOR PROPERTY ACQUIRED AFTER A DEBTOR'S
CHANGE IN LOCATION
Revised section 9-316, comment 2, provides:
This section addresses security interests that are perfected (i.e., that
have attached and as to which any required perfection step has been
taken) before the debtor changes its location. It does not apply to
security interests that have not attached before the location
changes.
154. R.U.C.C. § 9-316(b).
155. Id. IfC fails to act in State 2. its interest "becomes unperfected and is deemed never
to have.been perfectedas against a purchaser ofthe collateralfor value." The bankruptcy trustee
is not a purchaser for value. Therefore. C is perfected as of the commencement of the bankruptcy
case. Moreover. C does not risk retroactive unperfection and the potential preference exposure it
creates. II U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(C) (1998).
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A perfected security interest only exists if it has attached and all the
applicable steps for perfection have occurred. ,s6 Attachment requires the
debtor to have rights in the collateral. ls7 What if the debtor changes its
state of location and thereafter acquires rights in the collateral?
According to the above comment, a creditor has no lead time, no grace
period whatsoever, to perfect an interest in collateral its debtor acquires
after relocating to a new jurisdiction. This is not a problem for creditors
of corporate debtors because the state of location of those debtors can
never change. It is not a big problem for creditors ofconsumer debtors
because they generally cannot take a security interest in after-acquired
consumer goods. ISS It may be a HUGE problem for creditors financing
sole proprietors and general partnerships because such debtors can
change their state of location and their creditors can and often do take a
security interest in after-acquired collateral. This may be another gold
mine for bankruptcy trustees. The prudent creditor will prohibit a
nonregistered organization-debtor from relocating to another state
without the creditor's prior written con~ent. Assuming the debtor abides
by the security agreement, admittedly a big assumption, the creditor can
pre-file in the new jurisdiction. The prudent creditor will also monitor
such debtors for unauthorized interstate changes.
IV. FILING RULES
A. INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENTS - REVISED SECTION 9-50 I
The revisors had mercy on secured creditors. The Lord had mercy
on us. Revised Article 9's filing rules themselves are a cake walk.
Presumably this will mean, long term anyway, fewer security interests
to avoid because of filing mishaps. (Although the filing rules are easy,
figuring out which state's filing rules apply is not. Needless to say, if
the creditor follows Revised Article 9's' filing rules to the T but does so
in the wrong state, the creditor's situation is not ideal. It will be lethal
if the debtor petitions for bankruptcy relief.)
156. R.U.C.C. § 9-308(a).
157. Id. § 9-203(b)(2).
158. Id. § 9-204(b)( I) prohibits security interests in after-acquired consumer goods "other
than an accession when given as additional security. unless the debtor acquires rights in them within
10 days after the secured party gives value."' This apparently means a consumer can grant a security
interest in after-acquired security accounts. security entitlements and commodity contracts. See
R.U.C.C. § 9-108 cmt. 5.
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For fixture filings and other realty-based collateral, e.g., timber to
be cut and as-extracted collateral (minerals), Revised Article 9 requires
the creditor to file in the office where one would record a mortgage on
real estate. For everything else, 159 the creditor must file centrally in the
office designated by the state as official keeper of the state's U.C.C.
files. 160
Revised Article 9 eliminates local/central regimes and dual filing
requirements. Such filing regimes had no commercial utility and the
original drafters knew it when they proposed three alternative sets of
filing rules. 161 They also knew local clerks were powerful and a
proposed law that proposed to take away their revenues might not
become law. The original drafters bowed to political reality. The
political reality has changed.
B. CONTINUATION STATEMENTS
Revised Article 9 tracks old Article 9's approach to continuation
statements with two key exceptions. First, the debtor's insolvency
proceeding, state or federal, no longer tolls the creditor's duty to file a
continuation statement within the 6-month window prior to lapse ofthe
effectiveness of its filed financing statement. Official comment 4 to
revised U.C.C. section 9-515 explains:
Under Fonner Section 9-403(2), lapse was tolled if the debtor
entered bankruptcy or another insolvency proceeding. Neverthe-
less, being unaware that insolvency proceedings had been com-
menced, filing offices routinely removed records from the files as
if lapse had not been tolled. Subsection (c) deletes the fonner
tolling provision and thereby imposes a new burden on the secured
party: to be sure that a financing statement does not lapse during the
debtor's bankruptcy. The secured party can prevent lapse by filing
a continuation statement, even without first obtaining relief from
the automatic stay. See Bankruptcy Code Section 362(b)(3).
The implications of failing to file a continuation statement
postpetition seem limited to the creditor's post-bankruptcy situation.
According to the other change, lapse no longer means the creditor is
159. Other than transmitting utilities. see R.U.C.C. § 9-501(b).
160. R.U.C.C. § 9-50I(a)(2).
161. U.C.c. § 9-401(1) came in 3 alternatives.
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deemed unperfected as against a lien creditor, e.g., the bankruptcy
trustee who intervenes during the period of the creditor's perfection.
Even if the creditor, postpetition, fails to file a continuation statement
and its perfection therefore lapses, it will remain perfected as against the
bankruptcy trustee. Revised Article 9's retroactive unperfection rule is
limited to purchasers for value: "[i]fthe security interest or agricultural
lien becomes unperfected upon lapse, it is deemed never to have been
perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.,,162 The
comments state the obvious: "the provisions of this Article with respect
to lapse would be ofno effect to the extent that federal bankruptcy law
dictates a contrary result.,,163 Because the retroactive unperfection rule
no longer applies to lien creditors, the creditor's potential preference
exposure is reduced. l64
V. PERFECTION RULES
A. INTRODUCTION
Revised Article 9 recognizes four different methods ofperfection:
• filing,
• possession,
• automatic perfection, and
• control.
Not every perfection method is available to a creditor in any given case.
For instance, automatic perfection does not apply to security interests in
equipment or most other collateral for that matter. 165 A creditor cannot
perfect its interest in an account by possessing it (because no one, not
even a Revised Article 9 creditor, can possess intangible collateral). 166
Revised Article 9 makes three important changes in the Article 9
perfection rules.
162. R.U.c.c. § 9-5\5(c).
163. Id. § 9-5\5(c) cmt. 4.
164. See supra notes 149-151 & accompanying text.
165. R.U.C.C. §§ 9-309. 9-310.
166. Id. §§ 9-312. 9-3\ O.
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I. Revised Article 9 penn its a creditor to perfect its
interest in an instrument by filing a financing statement. 167
2. It expands the concept of perfection by control to more
than investment property.
3. It authorizes electronic filing.
B. FILING ON INSTRUMENTS
Revised section 9-3 12(a) penn its the creditor to file a financing
statement to perfect its interest in an instrument. The comments suggest
that this rule "is likely to be particularly useful in transactions involving
large numbers of notes that a debtor uses as collateral but continues to
collect from the makers.,,168 It is important here to distinguish between
perfection of an interest and priority ofthat interest. The creditor who
perfects by filing but does not take possession risks subordination to the
purchaser for value who takes possession without knowledge that its
purchase violates the creditor's rights. '69 One assumes the creditor with
an interest in instruments will never rely on filing alone unless posses-
sion is simply not feasible. That is, when possible, the creditor will both
file and possess. Creditors will want to continue to possess instruments
when feasible because their possession means no one else can obtain
possession and therefore, no one can defeat their priority claim to the
instruments.
Revised section 9-312(a)'s new rule regarding instruments serves
principally to shore up the creditor's position in bankruptcy. A
precautionary filing covering the debtor's instruments will preclude
trustee avoidance ofthe creditor's interest even though the creditor does
not possess the instruments. This safety precaution will prove especially
useful to secured creditors when they claim instruments as proceeds of
their collateral. A creditor's claim to proceeds is automatically and
continuously perfected without further action if "a filed financing
statement covers the original collateral, the proceeds are collateral in
which a security interest may beperfectedbyfiling in the office in wh ich
167. Id. § 9-312(3).
168. Id. § 9-312 emt. 2.
169. Id. § 9-330(d).
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the financing statement has been filed, and the proceeds are not acquired
with cash proceeds.,,'70
Revised section 9-312(a) eliminates yet another source of avoid-
able security interests. 171 After an initial bonanza of unperfected
security interests caused by the transition from old to new Article 9, it
is going to be slim pickings for bankruptcy trustees.
C. PERFECTION BY CONTROL
A security interest in investment property, deposit accounts, letter-
of-credit rights and electronic chattel paper may be perfected by control
of the collateral. 172 Control is the only form of perfection permitted for
security interests in deposit accounts as original collateral,173 and for
most situations involving letter-of-credit rights. '74
The revisors explain that control of a deposit account serves two
functions. Control is a satisfactory substitute for the attachment
requirement ofan authenticated agreement. 175 It is also the only way to
perfect a security interest in a deposit account as original collateral. '76
The concept of control involves or requires the debtor's consent. 177
Revised section 9-104 describes how a creditor obtains control of a .
deposit account. Control exists only if: (I) the secured creditor is the
depositary bank in which the account is maintained; or (2) the debtor,
secured creditor and depositary bank have agreed that the bank will
follow the creditor's instructions without the debtor's further consent;
or (3) the cred itor becomes the depositary bank's customer regarding the
account.
As Julian McDonnell observed,
a bank secured lender can be expected to insist on security interests
in deposit accounts maintained with it. The bank lender will
170. Id. §9-315(d)(I).
171. See. e.g.. Citicorp (USA), Inc. v. Davidson Lumber, 718 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1983)
(trustee avoided creditors' interest in certificate ofdeposit because creditors did not possess it when
debtor petitioned for bankruptcy relief).
172. R.U.C.C. § 9-314(a).
173. !d. § 9-312(b)(1).
174. !d. § 9-312(b)(2).
175. !d. § 9-104 cmt. 2.
176. !d.
177. !d. § 9-203(b)(3)(D) (attachment occurs ifvalue has been given, the debtor has rights
in the collateral and the creditor has control ofthe deposit accountpursuanllo the debtor's security
agreement).
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automatically have control ofsuch deposit accounts under new § 9-
104(a)( I) and will normally have priority over other secured
creditors under new § 9-327(3). The debtor may still enjoy access
to the account, but the bank will have a perfected interest in the
account even though no public disclosure ofthe interest is required.
Presumably, third parties will assume that the debtor's bank
accounts are or may be subject to a security interest. 178
He also noted,
"control" is not the functional equivalent ofpossession with respect
to deposit accounts or securities entitlements because control over
such assets does not require denying the debtor access to them. The
depositary bank and the securities intermediary automatically have
control over assets which they hold .... Therefore, these interests
must be added to the secret interests permitted by new § 9-309 in
assessing the extent to which the Revised Article departs from the
public notice policy.179
D. CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC CHATTEL PAPER, INVESTMENT PROPERTY AND
LETTER-OF-CREDIT RIGHTS
Revised section 9-1 05 describes how a creditor obtains control over
electronic chattel paper. As noted, the world has yet to "see" this new
fonn ofcollateral. Electronic chattel paper requires "a single authorita-
tive copy of the record or records which is unique, identifiable and,
except as otherwise provided is unalterable."'80 To date, the
technology does not exist to insure a single authoritative copy of a
record that is unique, identifiable and unalterable. When that technology
exists, creditors can perfect by control by following the steps described
in revised section 9-105.
The 1994 revisions to Article 9 accompanying the major overhaul
of Article 8 on Investment Securities introduced the concept ofperfec-
tion through control. Revised section 9-106 describes how a creditor
obtains control of investment property. The rules differ depending on
the nature of the investment property: is it a certificated security in
bearer fonn, a certificated security in registered fonn, an uncertificated
178. McDONNELL, supra note 92. § 9-104, at 90.
179. Jd. § 9·314, at 198-99.
180. R.U.C.C. § 9-105(1).
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security, or a commodity contract? A creditor can also perfect by filing
and in some cases (depending on the collateral), by possession.
Revised section 9-1 07 describes how a creditor obtains control over
letter-of-credit rights.
In addition to enjoying the right to perfect through control, the
creditor who perfects by control has priority over the creditor who does
not have control. '81 Generally speaking, creditors who have control are
ranked according to priority in time of obtaining controI. 182
E. ELECTRONIC FILING
Every school child knows that one impetus for revising Article 9
was to permit electronic filing. To facilitate paperless filings, Revised
Article 9 does not require the debtor's signature on the financing
statement. Does th is mean a creditor can file a valid financing statement
on a debtor without the debtor's permission, knowledge or consent? No,
it does not. A person is only entitled to file an initial financing
statement l83 if "the debtor authorizes the filing in an authenticated
record." 184
How does a debtor authorize a filing in an authenticated record?
Ifthe security agreement precedes the filing, the debtor's authentication
of the security agreement, without more, "authorizes the filing of an
initial financing statement ... covering the collateral described in the
security agreement.,,185 But what about creditors who "pre-file?"
Although Revised section 9-502, Official Comment 3, mentions the
181. Id. § 9-327( I)(deposit accounts); id. § 9-328(1 )(investment property); id. § 9-329(1)
(investment property).
182. See. e.g.,id. §§ 9-327(2), 9-328(2)(A).
183. Revised Article 9 simplifies the world of financing statements. There are only two
types of statements under Revised Article 9-initial financing statements and amendments.
Tennination statements and continuation statements are a type ofamendment. R.U.C.C. §§ 9-502
through 9-507 detail the ground rules for initial financing statements. R.U.C.C. § 9-512 discusses
amendments. An amendment can add or delete collateral or parties, continue or tenninate the
effectiveness of the filed financing statement, or otherwise change infonnation. R.U.C.C. § 9-
512(a). R.U.C.C. § 9-513 discusses when a debtor is entitled to a tennination statement and who
must do what. R.U.C.C. § 9-510(c) discusses the ground rules for continuation statements.
184. R.U.C.C. § 9-509(a)( I). The same holds true for amendments adding collateral or a
debtor. Id.
185. Id. § 9-509(b)( I). This is trickier than may first appear. Assume the creditor wants
to do an "all assets" financing statement. The security agreement grants the creditor a security
interest in the debtor's 1998 John Deere tractor. The security agreement only impliedly authorizes
the creditor to file a financing statement covering the tractor. The debtor will need to separately
authenticate the broader financing statement. The debtor's authentication ofthe security agreement
only authorizes the filing ofan initial financing statement covering the collateral described in the
security agreement.
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possibility of debtor ratification, the prudent creditor will have the
debtor sign or otherwise authenticate a record in which the debtor
expressly authorizes the creditor to file financing statements covering X
collateral, or X and Y type of collateral or "all assets."
F. SIGNIFICANT & OCCASIONALLY CONFUSING REVISED ARTICLE 9 RULES
REGARDING FINANCING STATEMENTS
To be valid under Revised Article 9, a financing statement need
only give the debtor's (Iegal)186 name, the name o.fthe secured creditor
or its representative, and "indicate[] the collateral covered by the
financing statement."187 Ifthat is all that Revised Article 9 requires by
way of valid financing statement, you might legitimately wonder why
the initial financing statement form included in revised section 9-521
asks for considerably more information.
The answer lies in distinguishing between what will suffice legally
as a valid financing statement if the filing officer accepts the statement
for filing, i.e., does not reject it, 188 and what information is necessary to
preclude the filing officer from rightfully rejecting the tendered
statement. Revised section 9-516(b) catalogues a host of situations in
which the filing officer is justified in rejecting the tendered statement
and a valid filing does not occur. For instance, the filing officer can
refuse to accept a statement that does not: provide a mailing address for
the secured creditor; 189 provide a mailing address for the debtor; 190 or
indicate whether the debtor is an individual or an organization. 191 In
short, the prudent creditor will provide all the information elicited by the
new financing statement form or risk filing office rejection of the
tendered statement. Val id rejection, ofcourse, means no effective fi ling,
and that, at a minimum, means a later filing date and hence, a later date
186. Revised Article 9 rejects trade name filings. RU.C.C. § 9-503(c).
187. !d. § 9-502(a).
188. !d. § 9-502(a).
189. !d. § 9-516(b)(4).
190. !d. § 9-516(b)(5)(A).
191. RU.C.C. § 9-516(b) catalogues the filing officer's grounds for rightfully refusing to
accept a tendered financing statement. R.U.C.C. § 9-516(b)(5)(C)(iii) authorizes a filing officer to
refuse to accept a financing statement that fails to indicate the "organizational identification number
for the debtor or [toJ indicate that the debtor has none." At a Revised Article 9 conference. one
panelist. Laurie Flynn, counsel to the Secretary of State's Office for the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, noted that technically her office could rightfully reject a financing statement that
did not indicate "none" in the organizational identification number block.
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for perfection with its attendant potential subordination to others and its
bankruptcy risks.
Revised Article 9 validates the supergeneric description, e.g., "all
assets" or "all debtor's personal property," for the financing statement. 192
That does not hold true for security agreement descriptions. 193
VI. PURCHASE-MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS (PMSls)
Unlike section 9-107, revised section 9-103 provides a detailed,
complicated eight-section definition of pmsi. Revised section 9-103
distinguishes between purchase-money collateral and purchase-money
debt. It discusses pmsis in software and establishes, by legislative fiat,
that a consignor's security interest in consigned goods is a pmsi in
inventory.
In large part, Revised Article 9's rules represent a dedicated
attempt to refute, reject, override, eliminate, eradicate and otherwise kill
the transformation rule in a commercial debtor context. 194 The transfor-
mation rule, a court-made doctrine, only recognizes a pmsi ifthe creditor
can establish a one-to-one correspondence between purchase-money debt
and purchase-money collateral. 195 The rule was born in the bankruptcy
courts in a consumer debtor setting. It represents a not-so-subtle attempt
to protect a debtor's ability to claim his or her exemptions in household
goods. II U.S.C. § 522(t)(I)(B) (1998) permits debtors to avoid
nonpossessory, non-pmsis in otherwise exemptible household goods.
This debtor avoidance power is limited to non-pmsis. For some courts,
cross-collaterization, refinancing or debt consolidation transformed the
creditor's pmsi into a non-pmsi. The collateral was no longer securing
or no longer just securing purchase-money debt. That, ofcourse, paved
192. Id. § 9-504(2).
193. Id. §§ 9-203(b)(3)(A), 9-108, 9-504 cmt. 2.
194. R.U.C.C. § 9-103 states rules for non-consumer-goods transactions. R.U.C.C. § 9-
I03(h) states: .
The limitation of the rules in subsections (e), (t), and (g) to transactions other than
consumer-goods transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination ofthe proper
rules in consumer-goods transactions. The court may not infer from that limitation the
nature of the proper rule in consumer-goods transactions and may continue to apply
establ ished approaches.
195. See. e.g., SouthtrustBank v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240(llthCir.
1983).
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the way for the debtor to avoid the interest and claim his or her exemp-
tion in the asset. 196
In Southtrust Bank v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp."97 the
Eleventh Circuit applied the transformation rule in a commercial,
nonbankruptcy setting, giving the first inventory lender priority to
inventory wholly financed by the second lender. It is hard to see what
policy, commercial or otherwise,justifies that result. It undermines the
point of giving superpriority to pmsi lenders. It actively discourages
folks from dealing with debtors if a prior secured lender exists. It
defeats the pmsi creditor's reasonable expectations of priority.
The Eleventh Circuit applied the transformation rule again in Snap-
On Tools. Inc. v. Freeman (In re Freeman):98 The court's pronounce-
ments indicate why some thought the floating lien was dead,199 at least
in the Eleventh Circuit:
[F]or the court to enforce a PMSI that consolidates a customer's
secured debts, as Snap-On did here, the lender must provide some
method for "determining the extent to which each item ofcollateral
secures its purchase money.".. , "[W]ithout some guidelines,
legislatIve or contractual, the court should not be required to distill
from a mass of transactions the extent to which a security interest
is purchase money." ... Unless the lender contractually provides
some method for determining the extent to which each item of
collateral secures its purchase money, it gives up its purchase
money status ....
Payments to Snap-On were to be allocated on a "first in first
out" basis as provided for in each agreement. . .. This method
provides no allocation among sales tax, interest and purchase price
although Snap-On must have intended to be paid for all three items.
Because the method for allocating the payments made by Freeman
is inadequate to determine which tools have been paid for and
which secure their own purchase price, Snap-On' s security interest
does not survive the consolidation of debts. 200
196. See. e.g.• In re Hilyard. 198 B.R. 620 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); Parish v. Lincoln Fin.
Co.• 147 B.R. 322 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992).
197.760 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1983).
198.956 F.2d 252 (11th Cir. 1992).
199. D. Benjamin Beard. The Purchase Money Security Interest in Inventory: /fIt Does Not
Float. It Must Be Dead. 57 TENN. L. REV. 437 (1990).
200. Snap-On Tools. 956 F.2d at 260.
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Itwas against this backdrop that the revisors drafted revised section
9-103. Goods (or software) securing a purchase-money obligation
incurred with respect to them are "purchase-money collateral.,,2ol An
obligation constitutes a "purchase-money obligation" if the obligation
represents either: (I) all or part ofthe purchase price ofthe collateral; or
(2) the value given to the obligor to acquire rights in the collateral.202
So, if Bank lends Debtor $50,000 to buy a cement mixer and takes a
security interest in it to secure Debtor's repayment obligation, the
cement mixer is purchase-money collateral because it secures a
purchase-money obligation. The $50,000 debt is a purchase-money
obligation because Debtor incurred it to acquire the cement mixer.
Moreover, both the price of collateral and the value given to enable a
debtor to acquire collateral include "sales taxes, duties, finance charges,
interest, freight charges, costs ofstorage in transit, demurrage, adminis-
trative charges, expenses ofcollection and enforcement, attorney's fees,
and other similar obligations.,,203
We note, in passing, that revised section 9-103 ends the debate
about whether a pmsi in non-goods is possible. Revised Article 9 limits
the possibility of a pmsi to goods and software.204 This prevents those
enabling a debtor to acquire nongoods, e.g., accounts or chattel paper,
to achieve priority over a prior filed creditor. Limiting pmsis to goods
(and software) shores up "the position of a first-filed floating lienor,,205
regarding nongoods collateral. No one can trump the first filed creditor.
The necessary predicate established by the definitions of
"purchase-money collateral" and "purchase-money obligation," revised
section 9-103(b) goes on to define "pmsi." A creditor has a pmsi in
goods "to the extent that the goods are purchase-money collateral with
respect to that security interest."206 Freely translated, to the extent the
security interest secures the obI igation incurred to acquire the collateral,
to that extent, the security interest is pmsi.
Reconsider the cement mixer hypo. Assume the cement mixer not
only secures its $50,000 purchase price but Debtor's obligation to pay
201. R.U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(I).
202. Id. § 9-103(a)(2).
203. Id. § 9-103 cm\. 3.
204. A pmsi in software is limited to situations in which the creditor is taking a security
interest in goods and software in an integrated transaction and the debtor wants an interest in the
software for "the principal purpose of using the software in the goods." R.U.C.C. § 9-103(c).
205. MCDONNELL, supra note 92, § 9·103, at 85. See also MBank Alamo N.A. v. Raytheon
Co., 886 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1989).
206. R.U.C.C. § 9-103(b)(I).
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Bank $100,000 for a delivery truck. Bank would have two security
interests in the cement mixer, one pmsi and one non-pmsi. It would have
a pmsi to the extent of $50,000, and a non-pmsi to the extent of
$100,000. What if the debtor pays down the loan or both loans?
Revised section 9-1 03(e) provides rules for applying payments made.
"[T]he payment must be applied in accordance with any reasonable
method ofapplication to which the parties agree," e.g., LIFO, FIFO, etc.
In the absence of agreement, payments should be applied in accordance
with the obligor's manifested intention,z°7 or failing that, first, to
obligations that are unsecured, ifmore than one obligation is secured, to
obligations secured by pmsis in the order in which they were incurred,
etc.20S
Revised Article 9 abolishes the Transformation Rule in a non-
consumer goods setting?09 It codifies (re-codifies?) the "dual status"
approach. Revised section 9-103(e)'s formulae and rules for applying
payments made enable the creditor to establish the extent to which its
security interest is pmsi and non-pmsi.
Revised Article 9 goes even further in the inventory context. A
security interest is pmsi
ifthe security interest is in inventory that is or was purchase-money
collateral, also to the extent that the security interest secures a
purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to other inventory
in which the secured party holds or helda purchase-money security
• 210mterest; ....
Revised section 9-1 03(b)(2) effectively exempts the inventory pmsi
lender from keeping track of payments made and/or allocating them to
items offinanced inventory according to some formula ifall obligations
owing are or once were purchase-money obligations and all collateral
is or once was purchase-money collateral. Ifthe inventory is, or at some
point, was purchase-money collateral (it secures, or once secured, a
purchase-money obligation), the lender has a pmsi in it to the extent it
secures a purchase-money obligation with respect to other inventory in
which the creditor has or had a pmsi. So, all purchase-money inventory
207. Id. § 9-103(e)(2).
208. Id. § 9-1 03(e)(3).
209. Id. § 9-103 cmt. 7 ("this Article rejects the ..transformation" rule adopted by some
cases. under which any cross-collaterization. refinancing or the Iike destroys the purchase-money
status entirely.").
210. Id. § 9-103(b)(2).
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secures all purchase-money obligations incurred to acquire the inventory
and the creditor's security interest in all the inventory is purchase-money
to the extent it secures any purchase-money obligation! Revised Article
9 seems to give the pmsi inventory lender complete protection if it
finances only the debtor's acquisition of inventory and limits its security
interest to the inventory financed. If the debtor does not incur any non-
purchase-money obligations and the creditor's security interest is limited
to collateral it financed, it does not seem possible for the inventory
lender to have a non-pmsU 11
One commentator summarized the effects of revised section 9-
103(b)(2) as follows:
Revised Article 9 ... pennits cross-collaterization of purchase-
money inventory advances so that the total of the purchase-money
inventory advances from the same supplier or lender may be
secured by successive shipments of the purchase-money collateral
from the same supplier or financed by the same lender.212
Revised Article 9's rejection of the transfonnation rule is limited
to the non-consumer context. Courts are free to do whatever they want
in the consumer goods context.213
211. As noted. "purchase-money obligation" includes finance charges. taxes. etc. The
comments provide the following example and explanation which help to distinguish Revised Article
9's treatment of pmsis in inventory from pmsis in other types of goods.
Seller (S) sells an item of inventory (Item-I) to Debtor (D), retaining a security
interest in Item-I to secure Item-I's pri~e and all other obligations, existing and
future, of D to S. S then sells another item of inventory to D (ltem-2), again
retaining a security interest in Item-2 to secure Item-2's price as well as all other
obligations of D to S....
Under subsection (b)(l), S's security interest in Item-I securing Item-2 's
unpaid price would be a purchase money security interest. This is so because S has
a purchase-money security interest in Item~ I, Item-I secures the price of (a
"purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to") ltem-2 ("other inventory"),
and Item-2 itselfwas subject to a purchase-money security interest. Note that, to the
extent Item-I secures the price of Item-2, S's security interest in Item-I would not
be a purchase-money security interest under subsection (b)(I). The security interest
in Item-I is a purchase-money security interest under subsection (b)( I) only to the
extent that Item-I is "purchase-money collateral," i.e., only to the extent that Item-I
"secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral (i.e.,
Item-I ).
R.U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 4, Example.
212. Edwin E. Smith, Overview ofRevised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. LJ. I (1999).
213. R.U.C.C. § 9-103(h) ("the limitation of the rules in subsections (e), (t), and (g) to
transactions other than consumer-goods transactions is intended to leave to the court the
determination of the proper rules in consumer-goods transactions").
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VII. TRANSITION RULES
A. SOME STATES OLD, SOME STATES NEW
Promulgation of Revised Article 9 posed two distinct sets of
"transition" issues: I) how to effect a (smooth) transition from old to
new regime that was fair to existing creditors; and 2) what to do if
Revised Article 9 was the law in some states, but not in others. On the
latter issue, the drafters predicted dire consequences, but offered few
solutions. One supposes the specter of horribles was designed to goad
all states to adopt Revised Article 9. The Official Comment to revised
section 9-70 I states:
While always important, uniformity is essential to the success of
this Article. Ifformer Article 9 is in effect in some jurisdictions,
and this Article is in effect in others, horrendous complications may
arise. For example, the proper place to file to perfect a security
interest (and thus the status of a particular security interest as
perfected or unperfected) would depend on whether the matter was
litigated in a State in which former Article 9 was in effect or a State
in which this Article was in effect. Accordingly, this section
contemplates that States will adopt a uniform effective date for this
Article. Anyone State's failure to adopt the uniform effective date
will greatly increase the cost and uncertainty surrounding the
transition.
Beyond the warning that warted toads would fall from the sky if all
states did not enact Revised Article 9 effective July 1,200 I, the drafters
put their heads in the sand.214 Bradley Smith, chair of the Transition
Task Force, noted that Revised Article 9 did not and could not address
this transition problem, although he believed it would undoubtedly arise
because some states would not enact the new law by July I, 200\.215
Although all states have adopted Revised Article 9, some have delayed
its effective date beyond July 1,2001 to permit their filing offices to
214. We exaggerate somewhat. Revised Article 9's choice-of-Iaw provisions address the
issue in part by directing courts to apply the substantive law ofthe jurisdiction. not its choice-of-Iaw
rules. See R.U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt. 3 & Section III. supra.
215. Bradley Y. Smith. New Article 9 Transition Rules, 74CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1339. 1352-
53 (1999). Mr. Smith was a member ofthe Article 9 Drafting Committee and chaired the Transition
Task Force. Id. at 1354 n.1.
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gear up for the new world order.216 These states must assume full
responsibility for any and all horrendous complications that arise from
a temporary lack of uniformity of law among the states.
What dreadful, albeit short-lived, complications can we expect?
Mr. Smith explains it as follows: assume
D is a corporation organized under the law ofState X with its
chief executive office located in State Y. The collateral is
accounts. Litigation concerning perfection of the security
interest is commenced in 2002. At that time, Revised Article
9 is in effect in State X but Old Article 9 is in effect in State
Y. The applicable law governing perfection depends upon
the selection ofthe forum state. Ifthe forum is in State Y (or
any other state in which Old Article 9 is in effect), then
Former section 9-1 03(3) will make the law ofState Y the law
governing perfection with a consequent requirement to file in
State Y. If, however, the forum is located in State X (or any
other state in which Revised Article 9 is in effect), perfection
will be governed by the law of State X with a consequent
requirement for filing in that jurisdiction. The disparity in
result obviously creates a potentially huge incentive for
forum shopping so long as Old Article 9 remains in effect in
any relevant jurisdiction.217
Smith notes the risk of forum shopping is somewhat reduced because
Old Article 9 defers to the law of the designated jurisdiction including
its choice-of-Iaw rules. Thus, "the choice ofa forum state governed by
Old Article 9 will change the result in our hypothetical only if the
jurisdiction determined pursuant to Former section 9-103(3) is also
governed by Old Article 9."218 If the forum state defers to the law of a
state that has enacted Revised Article 9, you will get the same result
whether suit is instituted in the forum state or not. So, he illustrates,
switch the states. Old Article 9 is in effect in State X and Revised Article
9 is in effect in State Y. Ifsuit is instituted in State X (where old Article
9 is in effect), State X will defer to State Y because the debtor's chief
216. Connecticut (effective October 1,200 I); Alabama. Florida. and Mississippi (effective
January I, 2002).
217. Smith. supra note 215. at 1353.
218./d.
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executive office is in State y.m According to State y's choice-oJ-law
rules,220 State X governs where and how in State X to perfect a security
interest in accounts.221
We assume well-advised secured creditors will "take the fork in the
road" until all is perfect in the most perfect of all perfect worlds and
Revised Article 9 is the law in every jurisdiction. Those seeking to file
will comply with old and new Article 9's perfection rules. Those
searching will search under both systems. Perfection according to both
sets of rules will immunize the security interest from Section 544(a)
strong-arm attack.
While states continues to operate under "former" Article 9, will
their Secretary of State's Offices reject financing statements regarding
debtors whose mailing address or chief executive office is in another
state? We think not. In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, for
instance, the Secretary of State's Office is very familiar with Revised
Article 9 and understands its choice-of-law rules.222 Presumably it will
accept such filings. 223
B. FROM OLD TO NEW SMOOTHLY AND FAIRLY: INTRODUCTION
All of Part 7 of Revised Article 9 is devoted to the task of
providing a smooth transition from old to new with time for creditors to
adjust to the new regime. As one participant noted,
[t]he transition provisions reflect a policy that [Revised Article 9's
changes relating to perfection of a security interest] should not
unfairly defeat the rights ofa secured party. This policy, however,
is tempered by the need ultimately for all parties to be playing by
the same set of rules-i.e., the uniform application of the require-
219. U.C.C. §9-103(3)(b).
220. R.U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1). 9-307(e).
221.1d.
222. Laurie Flynn, counsel to the Secretary of State's Office for the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. spoke at a Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education program on June 18,200 I.
Her presentation establ ished that the Office is both knowledgeable about and prepared for the
advent of Revised Article 9.
223. Moreover, the filing offices may follow some ofRevised Article 9's rules even though
it is not yet in effect. For instance. Revised Article 9 posits an exclusive list ofcircumstances under
which a filing office can (and must) reject a tendered financing statement. R.U.C.C. §§ 9-520(a).
9-5 16(b). Those circumstances do not include financing statements covering debtors with out-of-
state mailing addresses.
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ments of Revised Article 9. The transition provisions strike a
balance between these competing considerations.224
Part 7, "Transition," consists of8 provisions. The first provision,
section 9-70 I, states in full: "This [Act] takes effect on July I, 200 I."
You might think: "That wasn't bad. How hard could lother provisions
be?" Can you say, "VERY hard, as in turn-your-hair-white, severe-
stress-to-the-central-nervous-system, worse-than-the-most-inscrutable-
Tax-Code-provision HARD?"
Revised section 9-702(a) states the overarching 'transition" rule:
Except as otherwise provided in this part, this [Act] applies to a
transaction or lien within its scope, even if the transaction or lien
was entered into or created before this [Act] takes effect.
Freely translated, Revised Article 9 governs every transaction or lien
within its scope, whether the transaction or lien occurred before or after
Revised Article 9's effective date, unless a transition rule provides
otherwise. Unpacked and laid out, this sentence establishes that the
transition rules address three different categories of transactions:
# I. transactions entered into AFTER Revised Article
9's effective date and within its scope - that is, NEW orpost-
effective date Article 9 transactions;
#2. PED transactions and liens NOT governed by old
Article 9 but within Revised Article 9's scope; and·
#3. PED transactions governed by former Article 9.
C. POST-EFFECTIVE DATE (NEW) TRANSACTIONS
Revised section 9-70 I, delaying Revised Article 9' s effective date
until July I, 200 I, is the only "transition rule" for post-effective date
transactions and liens within Revised Article 9's scope. There is no
transition period, after the effective date, for players to adjust to the new
rules of the game. Transactions within Revised Article 9's scope that
224. Smith. supra note 215. at 1348.
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occur after its effective date are subject to its rules.225 So, players
playing after the effective date need to know Revised Article 9's rules
before they go out onto the field. The distinction between transactions
within or beyond old Article 9's scope is irrelevant. Revised Article 9
governs ALL post-effective date transactions within its scope -- period,
end of sentence. So the creditor who, post-effective date, wants to take
and perfect a security interest in aJohn Deere tractor or IBM's inventory
of computers is subject to Revised Article 9 as is the buyer who, post-
effective date, buys any right to payment that qualifies as a Revised
Article 9 account or the creditor who takes a security interest in any right
to payment that qualifies as a Revised Article 9 account. III-advised
and/or clueless secured creditors, true-blue consignors, agricultural
lienors, etc., are all going to be cannon fodder for bankruptcy trustees.
D. PRE-EFFECTIVE DATE ("PED") TRANSACTIONS & LIENS
In addition to post-effective date transactions and liens within its
scope, Revised Article 9 applies to two different types of PED transac-
tions: I) transactions governed by former Article 9; and 2) transactions
that were not governed by former Article 9 but which would have been
governed by Revised Article 9 had they occurred after its effective date.
This is subject to one exception. Revised Article 9 does not affect PED
transactions subject to litigation pending at the time it became
effective.226
1. PED Transactions & Liens Not Governed by Former Article 9 that
Would Have Been Governed by Revised Article 9 Had They Occurred
after Its Effective Date
Revised Article 9 provides special rules for PED non-Article 9
transactions that would have been subject to Revised Article 9 had they
occurred after its effective date, e.g., PED agricultural liens, consign-
ments, security interests in commercial deposit accounts, commercial
tort claims, etc. First, it recognizes and respects such PED non-Article
9 transactions and Iiens if they were validly entered into or created
225. R.U.C.C. § 9-702(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this part. this [Act] applies to
a transaction or Iien within its scope ... :').
226. "This [Act] does not affect an action, case, or proceeding commenced before this [Act]
takes effect:' R.U.C.C. § 9-702(c).
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PED.227 Second, along with blessing the rights, duties and interests
tlowing"228 from such PED non-Article 9 transactions, Revised Article
9 gives parties a choice regarding their post-effective date conduct.
They can terminate, complete, consummate or enforce their rights
according to Revised Article 9 or the non-Article 9 law that governed
them PED.229
2. PED Transactions Subject to Former Article 9
The remainder of Part 7,230 and hence, the bulk of the transition
rules, is devoted principally to PED Article 9 transactions.231 Because
Revised Article 9 governs all transactions and liens within its scope
even ifthe transaction or lien arose PED, PED Article 9 creditors need
to know
]. the status, post-effective date, of their PED interests;
2. what, if anything, they need to do, post-effective date, to
preserve or continue their PED interests;
3. if they need to do something, how long they have to do it,
and what they need to do;
and
4. the applicable priority rules.
Two distinctions are key to understanding the transition rules for
PED Article 9 security interests:
227. R.U.C.C. § 9-702(b)( I) ("transactions and liens that were not governed by [former
Article 9), were validly entered into or created before this [Act] takes effect, and would be subject
to this [Act) if they had been entered into or created after this [Act) takes effect, and the rights.
duties, and interests flowing from those transactions and liens remain valid after this [Act) takes
effect; ...").
228. Id. § 9-702(b)( I).
229. Id. § 9-702(b)(2).
230. Id. §§ 9-703 through 9-708.
231. We say "principally" because some of the discussion that follows applies with equal
force to PED non-Article 9 security interests.
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I) the distinction between a perfected and an unper-
fected PED security interest; and
2) within the category of perfected PED interests, the
distinction between a security interest perfected by filing and
any other perfected interest.
a. Creditors Holding Perfected Security Interests on Effective Date of
Revised Article 9
The Long & the Short of It: The rules here are complicated. We
think we have figured them out. We offer the following brief summary
as a navigation guide.
The creditor whose security interest was perfected immediately
before Revised Article 9 takes effect holds a perfected interest under
Revised Article 9.232 The real issue is how long the creditor enjoys
perfection post-effective date when its interest does not comply with
Revised Article 9's enforceability and/or perfection rules. If the
creditor's perfection is based on a filing, the creditor has the earlier of
the time its perfection would have ceased to be effective under the law
ofthe jurisdiction governing perfection according to former Article 9 or
June 30, 2006 to reperfect according to Revised Article 9's rules.233 If
the creditor's perfection is based on something other than a filing, it has
one year after the effective date to conform to the new regime.234
The "Long" of It - Creditors whose PED perfection steps also
comply with Revised Article 9: All PED creditors have a perfected
security interest under Revised Article 9 if they had an enforceable
security interest that would have enjoyed priority over a lien creditor
immediately before Revised Article 9 took effect.235 This is so whether
or not the interest satisfied Revised Article 9 's requirements for
232. R.U.C.C. § 9-703.
233. Id. § 9-705(c).
234. Id. § 9-703(b).
235. Id. § 9-703(a) speaks of"a security interest that ... would have priority over the rights
of a person that becomes a lien creditor:' Why didn't the revisors just say "perfected security
interest." which is far less cumbersome? The word "perfection" is an Article 9 term of art.
Technically. it does not apply to non-Article 9 security interests. But R.U.C.C. § 9-703 governs
both PED Article 9 security interests and non-Article 9 transactions and liens. For ease of
expression, we use the term "perfected" colloquially to refer to all interests that would have priority
over a subsequent lien creditor.
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enforceability and perfection when Revised Article 9 took effect.236 So,
the PED interest that is "perfected" immediately before Revised Article
9's effective date continues perfected under Revised Article 9.
What if the creditor's PED actions to perfect under old Article 9
would also satisfY Revised Article 9's perfection requirements?2J7 Then,
the creditor need do nothing further according to revised U.C.C. section
9-703(a).238 This is not to say the creditor can retire to the billiards room
and drink sherry for the duration. Revised U.C.C. section 9-703(a) is
simply saying the PED creditor does not need to do anything further to
make the transition into RevisedArticle 9. The "transition" is complete
on Revised Article 9's effective date. The creditor is subject to the new
game rules without further ado. But the new rules, like the old ones,
may require creditor protective action. For instance, even the bionic
Revised Article 9 security interest has a fixed life of 5 years in most
cases.239 This means the PED Article 9 creditor, now fully anointed
Revised Article 9 creditor, must file a continuation statement according
to the Revised Article 9 rules if it wants to continue the effectiveness of
its PED filed financing statement.240 It must refile according to Revised
Article 9's rules to maintain its perfected status following a change in
the debtor's state of location241 or name,242 etc.
The "Long" of It-ereditor whose PED perfection steps do NOT
comply with Revised Article 9: What if the creditor's PED acts do not
satisfY Revised Article 9's rules regarding attachment and/or perfection?
Then, the creditor must act post-effective date. It must comply with
Revised Article 9's perfection steps. The time frame for such action will
depend on whether the PED creditor perfected by filing or some other
means. According to revised section 9-703(b), creditors who perfected
by means other than filing have one year from Revised Article 9's
236. R.U.C.C. § 9-703(a) & (b).
237. See id. § 9-703(a). "Perfection" or the "perfection requirements" includes both the
requirements ofenforceability (attachment) and the applicable steps for perfection. U.c.c. § 9-
303( I); R.U.C.C. § 9-308(a).
238. R.U.C.C. § 9-703(a) provides:
A security interest that is enforceable immediately before this [Act] takes effect and
would have priority over the rights of a person that becomes a lien creditor at that
time is a perfected security interest under this [Act] if, when this [Act] takes effect,
the applicable requirements for enforceability and perfection under this [Act] are
satisfied without further action.
239. R.U.c.c. § 9-515(a).
240. Id. § 9-515(c).
241. See. e.g., R.U.C.C. § 9- 316 (effect of change in governing law on perfection).
242. Id. § 9- 507(c) (seriously misleading change in debtor's name).
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effective date to conform to Revised Article 9's attachment and/or
perfection rules. What about PED creditors who perfected by filing?
Their perfection wi II last until the earlier of the time their financing
statement would have ceased to be effective under the law of the
jurisdiction that governed perfection according to old section 9 -103 or
June 30, 2006.243
Revisedsection 9-703(b) 's ..one-year" rulefor PED creditors who
perfected by means other than afiling: Revised section 9-703 provides
in part:
(b) Continuing Priority over lien creditor: perfection requirements
not satisfied.
Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-705, if, immedi-
ately before this [Act] takes effect, a security interest is enforceable
and would have priority over the rights ofa person that becomes a
lien creditor at that time, but the applicable requirements for
enforceability or perfection under this [Act] are not satisfied when
this [Act] takes effect, the security interest:
(I) is a perfected security interest for one year after this [Act]
takes effect;
(2) remains enforceable thereafter only ifthe security interest
becomes enforceable under Section 9-203 before the year expires;
and
(3) remains perfected thereafter only if the applicable
requirements for perfection under this [Act] are satisfied before the
year expires.244
As this provision underscores, the PED perfected creditor can lose
its perfected status post-effective date in one of two ways. It can either
fail to comply with Revised Article 9's enforceability requirements, i.e.,
the requirements for attachment (revised section 9-203), or it can fail to
comply with its perfection rules.
Given that Revised Article 9's attachment requirements resemble
those offormer Article 9, how could a PED perfected Article 9 creditor
manage to lose its security interest post-effective date? We do not think
it will happen often. The comments give two examples. Official
Comment 2 to revised section 9-703 describes the consumer debtor who
grants a security interest in "all her securities accounts." Revised
243. fd. § 9·705(c).
244. fd. § 9-703(b).
NO.2 ODYSSEY FOR ARTICLE 9 SECURED CREDITOR 159
section 9-108(e)(2), detailing Revised Article 9's description require-
ments, says a description by type of Article 9 collateral is insufficient
when describing "consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities
account, or a commodity account" in a consumer transaction.245 Because
a security interest is not enforceable (does not attach) unless the security
agreement adequately describes the collateral, and Revised Article 9
says "all securities accounts" is an inadequate description, the creditor
has not complied with Revised Article 9's requirements for enforceabil-
ity. Unless the creditor, within one year of Revised Article 9's effective
date, gets the debtor to authenticate a new security agreement that
adequately describes the collateral, the creditor will lose its security
interest. It will detach by operation of law. (The revisors do not
describe how the creditor persuades the debtor to authenticate a new
security agreement. With luck, the existing security agreement will
contain a debtor covenant to execute any documents necessary to protect
the creditor's interest and a clause defining "default" to include breach
of any covenant.)
The Official Comments also describe an oral agreement to sell a
payment intangible (or promissory note), noting that an oral agreement
does not satisfY Revised Article 9's requirements for attachment.246
Revised Article 9 requires an authenticated security agreement. Will the
buyer's failure to obtain one within one year of Revised Article 9's
effective date cause the buyer to lose its ownership interest? Arguably
no, because a PED non-Article 9 transaction can be terminated,
completed, consummated and enforced under ''the law that would
otherwise apply if Revised Article 9 had not taken effect.,,247 But the
buyer may want the protection and safety ofRevised Article 9's rules in
which case it will behoove the buyer to obtain the necessary authenti-
cated security agreement from the seller.
Revised section 9-703, Official Comment 3, raises an important
issue. What if the PED security agreement uses a Code term of art to
describe the collateral and Revised Article 9 redefines the term? For
instance, "account" under former Article 9 was limited to rights to
payment for goods sold or leased, or services rendered.248 The Revised
Article 9 definition includes rights to payment for any kind of
245. Ditto for commercial tort claims. Id. § 9-1 08(e)(I).
246. Id. § 9-703 cmt. I.
247. R.U.C.C. § 9-702(2).
248. U.c.c. § 9-106.
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property-real estate and intangible property as well as goods-sold,
leased, or licensed as well as lottery winnings.249 Assume Debtor's PED
security agreement grants Creditor a security interest in "all its current
and after-acquired accounts?" Will Creditor's collateral under Revised
Article 9 include Debtor's lottery winnings or rights to payment for real
estate sold? The comments instruct that standard rules of contract
interpretation will govern construction ofthe parties' agreement. Absent
special language or other circumstances, however, if parties use Code
terms of art to describe collateral, it is presumed that they intend the
defined meaning. "The [PED] agreement of the parties presumptively
create[s] a security interest in 'accounts' as defined in former Article
9."250 In Debtor's subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, the trustee could
challenge Creditor's assertion of a security interest in Debtor's lottery
winn ings or its right to receive payment from the sale of real estate.
What might the creditor do in such a situation/ It has two choices.
Post-effective date, it could re-do the loan documents using the terms as
newly defined by Revised Article 9. It could also re-do the loan
documents pre-effective date, describing the collateral as '''accounts' as
defined in the UCC Article 9 of [State X], as that definition may be
amendedfrom time to time.,,251
How might a PED perfected creditor lose its perfected status under
Revised Article 9 as a result of something other than the failure to file
a financing statement according to Revised Article 9's perfection rules?
Revised section 9-703, Official Comment 2, example 2, discusses the
PED bailee in possession of instruments, who has received notification
of the secured creditor's claim. That was sufficient to perfect a credi-
tor's interest under former Article 9.252 It is not sufficient under Revised
Article 9. Revised Article 9 requires the bailee to acknowledge that it
holds for the creditor.253 The creditor who wishes to continue its
perfected status beyond one year after Revised Article 9's effective date
needs to obtain, within that one-year period, the bailee's acknowledge-
ment that it holds the collateral for the creditor.
Does this "one-year-after-the-effective-date-to-act" rule also apply
to the creditor with a PED perfected security interest in the debtor's
lottery winnings or rights to payment from licenses or real estate, etc.,
249. R.U.e.C. § 9-1 02(a)(2).
250. Id. § 9·703 em!. 3. Example 3.
251. Id.
252. U.e.e. § 9-305.
253. R.U.e.C. § 9-313.
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etc., who filed a financing statement covering "general intangibles?" A
financing statement listing "general intangibles" would not perfect the
creditor's interest under Revised Article 9 because Revised Article 9
classifies such rights as accounts. But revised section 9-703 and its one-
year rule do not govern because the situation involves perfection by
filing. Revised section 9-705 applies.
PED Creditors Who Perfected by Filing:
a) How Long to Act?
Revised section 9-705 is captioned "Effectiveness of action taken
before effective date." Our discussion focuses on the effectiveness under
Revised Article 9 of financing statements filed PED.2s4
Three possible permutations exist:
# 1. financing statements filed PED that comply with the
perfection requirements of both old and new Article 9;
#2. financing statements filed PED that comply with
new Article 9 but not old Article 9; and
#3. financing statements filed PEDthatcomply with old
Article 9 but not new Article 9.255
Revised section 9-705(b) states the governing rule for situations 1
and 2. A financing statement filed PED is effective to perfect a security
interest under Revised Article 9 to the extent it satisfies RevisedArticle
9's perfection requirements. This includes PED filings that complied
with old Article 9's perfection rules and those that were ineffective to
perfect the creditor's interest under former Article 9. This rule encour-
aged creditors to comply with Revised Article 9's perfection rules before
Revised Article 9 became effective. PED filings that comply with
254. Wejust discussed the effect ofPED action other than filing on interests that only attach
post-effective date.
255. A fourth possibility exists. of course. a financing statement filed PED that does not
comply with either old or new Article 9. We can say about that creditor what they said about
Austria between the two World Wars: In Germany. the situation is serious but not hopeless. In
Austria.. the situation is hopeless. but not serious.
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Revised Article 9 but not old Article 9 become effective the minute
Revised Article 9 becomes effective.256
Revised section 9-705(b)'s validation of PED filings that were
ineffective at the time they were made covers a gamut of filings:
The secured party may have consciously decided to "pre-file" in the
filing jurisdiction mandated by Revised Article 9 before it was
necessary or legally effective to do so. Alternatively, such a filing
may simply have been made in error. In addition, descriptions of
collateral which were ineffective either generally or as to particular
types of collateral may become effective under Revised Article 9.
Subsection (b) gives effect to all such filings, whether to the
calculated or serendipitous benefit of the secured party.257
What about situation #3, PED financing statements that perfected
a creditor's interest under former Article 9, but which do not satisfy
Revised Article 9's filing requirements? According to revised section
9-705(c), Revised Article 9 does not render them ineffective but, with
certain exceptions, they cease to be effective as ofthe earlier ofJune 30,
2006 or the time the PED financing statement would have ceased to be
effective according to the (former) law ofthe jurisdiction where it was
filed.258
Recall that revised section 9-705(c) is an exception to revised
section 9-703's general rule that a PED perfected creditor has one year
to conform to Revised Article 9's attachment and perfection rules. This
exception governs PED security interests that were perfected PED by a
filing in compliance with former Article 9. In such cases, the PED
creditor must reperfect according to Revised Article 9's rules within the
earlier ofthe time its perfection would have expired according to former
Article 9 or June 30, 2006. The PED perfected-by-filing creditor will
have less than one year to act in some cases and more than one year to
reperfect according to Revised Article 9's rules in others.259
For instance, assume SP, PED, properly perfects by a filing in State
X on August 1, 2000. Revised Article 9 becomes effective in State X
256. According to R.U.C.C. § 9-705. cmt. 3, "[w]hen this Article takes effect. the filing
becomes effective to perfect a security interest." This makes sense. A PED filing that failed to
comply with former Article 9 has no legal significance. It can only have legal significance when
the law recognizing its significance becomes effective.
257. Id. at 1341-42.
258. R.U.C.C. § 9-705(c).
259. Id. § 9-705 cmt. 4.
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and State Y on July 1,200 I. Perfection under Revised Article 9 would
require SP to file centrally in State Y. Absent further facts, SP's security
interest remains perfected until July 31,2005, the end of its 5 year life
according to State X's former Article 9.260 It would have a little over 4
years to comply with Revised Article 9's filing rules.
Assume instead that SP, PED, properly perfected by a filing in
State X. On July 1,2001, the effective date of Revised Article 9, SP's
filed financing statement has 7 months "to go." (Because 7 months prior
to lapse is outside the 6-month window for filing a valid continuation
statement,26I SP cannot continue the effectiveness of its financing
statement under old Article 9 before July 1,2001.) SP has 7 months to
comply with Revised Article 9's perfection rules. At the end of 7
months, its financing statement would have ceased to be effective under
the law ofthe jurisdiction in which it was filed. (Had July 1,2001 fallen
within SP's 6-month window to file a continuation statement under
former Article 9 and SP had timely filed a valid continuation statement
PED, it would have close to 5 full years to "transition" into Revised
Article 9, i.e., to comply with Revised Article 9's perfection rules.
Revised section 9-705(c) means prudent searchers, post-effective
date, cannot search on the basis ofRevised Article 9's filing rules alone.
Until June 30, 2006, they must look for outstanding claims according to
the old and new filing rules. Revised section 9-705(c)(2)'s absolute cut
off date of June 30, 2006 limits this burden to 5 years.262
b) What the PED Perfected-by-Filing Creditor Should Do?
The creditor who perfected by filing PED could simply reperfect
according to Revised Article 9's rules. It could reperfect before or after
Revised Article 9's effective date. But reperfection will not preserve the
priority date established by its PED filing. If it chooses to reperfect, it
will lose that priority date once its PED financing statement ceases to be
effective according to the law of the jurisdiction in which it was filed.
It will have a new priority date based on the date it reperfected accord ing
260. What ifSP's collateral were ordinary goods. requiring a filing in State X. the law ofthe
state where the goods are. but on July 2, 200 I, one day after Revised Article 9's effective date, the
debtor moves the goods to State Z? The question was raised on the UCC List-Serv. Steven Weise
reasoned that the creditor would have 4 months to perfect according to Revised Article 9's
perfection rules because SP's PED filing in State X would cease to be effective under the law of
State X 4 months after the goods were brought into and kept in State Z.
261. U.C.C. § 9-403(3).
262. R.U.c.c. § 9-705, cmt. 4.
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to Revised Article 9's rules. The prudent perfected-by-filing creditor
will want to continue the effectiveness of its PED filed financing
statement.
How does a PED perfected creditor continue the effectiveness of
its PED filed financing statement?
It depends. Assume the creditor's PED filing complies with
Revised Article 9's filing requirements. That is, PED, the creditor files
its financing statement in the state and in the relevant office designated
by Revised Article 9.263 The content of the filed financing statement
satisfies Revised Article 9's requirements.264 In that case (and only in
that case), the creditor can continue the effectiveness of its filed
financing statement by filing a ''true'' continuation statement.265
For example, assume 0, Inc., incorporated in California, has its
chief place of business in California. PED, Creditor takes a security
interest in 0, Inc.'s rights to receive payment for goods sold ("accounts"
under old and new Article 9). Creditor files centrally in California. The
financing statement gives the correct legal names and addresses of the
debtor and creditor and lists accounts. Creditor holds a PED perfected
security interest in 0, Inc.'s accounts. Its PED actions to perfect also
comply with Revised Article 9's perfection requirements.266 Therefore,
post-effective date, Creditor can continue the effectiveness of its filed
financing statement by filing a continuation statement within the 6-
month period preceding lapse of its PED financing statement.267 By
continuing the effectiveness of its filed financing statement, of course,
Creditor also preserves the priority date established by its PED filing.
Now assume the creditor's PED filing does not comply with
Revised Article 9's filing requirements. Revised Article 9 would require
the creditor to file in a different state or a different office within the
263. See R.U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-307, 9-501.
264. See Part V of Revised Article 9.
265. "A financing statement filed before the effective date of this Article may be continued
only by filing in the State and office designated by this Article:' R.U.C.C. § 9-705 cmt. 5.
266. Although R. U.c.c. § 9-521's form financing statement elicits much more information
than that required under former Article 9, R.U.C.C. § 9-502(a) establishes that a filed financing
statement is sufficient if it provides the name of the debtor, the name of the secured party or a
representative and indicates the collateral covered. Most financing statements filed PED that perfect
a creditor's interest will satisfy R.U.C.C. § 9·502(a). We say "most" because some cases
interpreting former U.c.c. § 9-402(7) recognized the validity of a trade name filing. See. e.g.,
Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco), 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1981). Revised Article 9
overrides that case law. R.U.C.C. § 9-503(a).
267. R.U.C.C. § 9-515(d).
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state. 268 For example, assume SP properly perfected its interest PED by
filing locally in State A. The Revised Article 9 perfection rules require
a filing in State B or a central filing in State A. SP cannot continue the
effectiveness of its PED financing statement by filing a continuation
statement locally in State A. "A financing statement filed before the
effective date ofthis Article may be continued only byfiling in the State
and office designated by this Article.,,269
Revised Article 9 substantially changes the choice-of-Iaw rules
governing perfection. Consequently, in many cases, the creditor's PED
filing will not conform with Revised Article 9's perfection rules. So,
how does a creditor continue the effectiveness of its PED filing and
thereby preserve its PED priority date? Revised section 9-706 describes
the process.
Revised section 9-706 is captioned "When Initial Financing
Statement Suffices to Continue Effectiveness of Financing Statement."
Revised section 9-706(a) describes this special initial financing
statement as "in Iieu ofa continuation statement." Freely paraphrased,
a creditor can continue the effectiveness of its PED financing statement
if it
1) files an initial financing statement that complies with
Revised Article 9's rules regarding content (Part 5);
2) files it where Revised Article 9 would require a
financing statement to be filed to perfect the creditor's
security interest;
3) identifies (on that initial financing statement) the
PED financing statement by filing office, date of filing and
file number as well as the date and number ofall continuation
statements; and
4) states the PED filed financing statement remains
effective.270
268. A PED filing also might not comply because Revised Article 9 redefines the collateral.
E.g., assume the collateral is the debtor-licensor's right to receive payment under a license. The
PED financing statement indicates the collateral as "general intangibles." Under Revised Article
9, the collateral is an account. The creditor has not satisfied Revised Article 9's perfection
requirements. The financing statement fails to indicate the collateral covered.
269. R.U.C.C. § 9-705 cmt. 5.
270. Id. § 9-706(c).
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These requirements are intended to pennit searchers to find the
necessary infonnation about PED filings.
Although this initial financing statement filed "in lieu of a
continuation statement" ("in lien" financing statement) has the effect of
continuing the effectiveness of the creditor's PED filed financing
statement and maintaining the creditor's PED priority date, it is not a
continuation statement. "It is governed by the rules applicable to initial
financing statements."271 So, for example, unlike a continuation
statement which must be filed within the 6-month period prior to
expiration ofthe filed financing statement, the "in lieu" initial financing
statement can "be filed any time during the effectiveness of the pre-
effective date financing statement--even before this Article is enacted
•••."272 So, too, "[i]n contrast to a continuation statement, which
extends the lapse date of a filed financing statement for five years, the
initial financing statement has its own lapse date, which bears no
relation to the lapse date of the pre-effective date financing statement
whose effectiveness the initial financing statementcontinues."273 So, the
"in lieu" financing statement continues the effectiveness of the PED
financing statement for 5 years from the date the "in lieu" statement is
filed. 274
The comments are careful to point out that "an initial financing
statement filed before the effective date ofthis Article does not continue
the effectiveness of a pre-effective-date financing statement unless the
latter remains effective on the effective date of this Article."m This
makes sense. An "in lieu" initial financing statement has no legal effect
until Revised Article 9 becomes effective. If the PED filed financing
statement has expired by the time Revised Article 9 and the "in lieu"
statement become effective, there is nothing the "in lieu" statement can
preserve or continue.
The "in lieu" financing statement, like any other initial financing
, statement, must comply with Revised Article 9 (although the debtor need
271. [d. § 9-706, cmt. I.
272. [d. § 9-706, cmt. I.
273. [d. § 9-706 cmt. I.
274. Bradley Smith, chair of the Transition Task Force, states that the filing of an "in lieu
of' initial financing statement "continues the effectiveness of the pre-effective date financing
statement for the period applicable to an initial financing statement, as specified in Old U.c.c. § 9-
403 if the continuation filing is made prior to the effective date of Revised Article 9 and for the
period specified in section 9-515 if the continuation filing is made after the effective date:' Smith,
supra note 215, at 1345.
275. R.U.C.C. § 9-706 cmt. I.
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not authorize the filing). Thus, it must indicate the type ofcollateral as
defined by Revised Article 9, For example, assume the PED financing
statement listed general intangibles and was intended to perfect the
creditor's interest in the debtor's lottery winnings. The "in lieu of'
initial financing statement needs to indicate "accounts.,,276 So, too, it
must give the debtor's legal name, even if the PED filing gave the
debtor's trade name and that was sufficient, PED, to perfect the credi-
tor's interest.277
One "in lieu" statement can continue the effectiveness ofmultiple
PED filings. 278 It must simply identifY all PED financing statements by
indicating the office in which they were filed, the dates they were filed,
their file numbers and their most recent continuation statement, ifany.279
As noted, the "in lieu" statement must also indicate that the PED
statements are to continue effective.280
The rules governing the "in lieu of' initial financing statement -
when it can be filed, what it has to say, how it must make PED filings
conform to Revised Article 9's requirements, when it has to be contin-
ued - are not easy, One little slip and the creditor will lose its perfected
status at some point post-effective date. One of two dastardly things
could happen thereafter. Either the creditor never realizes the problem,
the debtor files bankruptcy and the trustee avoids the creditor's interest
under § 544(a), or the creditor realizes the mistake, corrects it and less
than 90 days later, the debtor files bankruptcy, and the creditor's interest
is a preference.
By way of re-cap, let's distinguish the effect of filing a plain old
"initial financing statement," (a financing statement that complies with
all of Revised Article 9's requirements) from the effect offiling an "in
lieu" initial financing statement. The creditor who files an initial
financing statement that complies with Revised Article 9 perfects its
interest according to Revised Article 9's rules. If a creditor files that
276. [d. § 9-706 cmt. 2.
277. Bradley Smith describes the "in lieu of' initial financing statement as follows:
Section 9-705(t) states the rule that a financing statement comprising both an initial
filing made prior to the effective date of Revised Article 9 and a continuation
statement filed after such effective date "is effective only to the extent that it satisfies
the requirements of Part 5 [ofRev ised Article 9] for an initial financing statement."
In other words, to the extent that the pre-effective date fiI ing does not itsel f satis/)'
those requirements, the continuation statement must remedy the deficiency.
Smith, supra note 215, at 1344.
278. R.U.C.C. § 9-706 cmt. 2.
279. [d. § 9-706(c)(2).
280. [d. § 9-706(c)(3).
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initial financing statement PED (and does not comply with the perfection
rules of former Article 9), the initial financing statement becomes
effective on the date Revised Article 9 becomes effective.281 Ifit is filed
after Revised Article 9 becomes effective, it becomes effective when
filed. It has no effect on the creditor's PED filed financing statement.
It will not continue the effectiveness ofa creditor's PED filed financing
statement. It will not preserve a creditor's PED' priority date. In
contrast, an "in lieu" statement, assuming it is done properly, will
continue the effectiveness ofthe creditor's PED financing statement and
will preserve the creditor's PED priority date.
b. PED Creditors Holding Enforceable But Unperfected Security
Interests Immediately before Revised Article 9 Takes Effect
Revised section 9-704 discusses PED security interests that are
enforceable but unperfected immediately before Revised Article 9 takes
effect. It states another one-year rule. These rules, mercifully, are
straightforward.
First, the security interest remains enforceable for one year.282
Second, it remains enforceable beyond the one-year period if
1) it satisfied Revised Article 9's enforceability (attach-
ment) requirements when Revised Article 9 took effect; or
2) the creditor takes action within one year after
Revised Article 9's effective date to satisfy those require-
ments.283
Third, the unperfected PED interest becomes perfected under
Revised Article 9 when it satisfies Revised Article 9's perfection
requirements.284 If it satisfies Revised Article 9's perfection require-
ments as ofRevised Article 9's effective date, it is perfected at that time.
No further action is necessary. Otherwise, it becomes perfected when
28 J. "Ifan initial financing statement is filed under this section before the effective date of
this Article, it takes effect when this Article takes effect (assuming it is ineffective under former
Article 9)."' R.U.C.C. § 9-706 cmt. I.
282. R.U,C.C. § 9-704(1).
283. !d. § 9-704(2).
284. !d. § 9-704(3).
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the creditor does what Revised Article 9 requires it to do to perfect the
interest.285
When would a PED security interest, unperfected immediately
before the effective date of Revised Article 9, become perfected on
Revised Article 9's effective date without further action? The Official
Comment discusses the PED filing of an "all assets" financing
statement.286 According to a vast majority ofcourts interpreting fonner
Article 9, a supergeneric de~cription on a financing statement was
invalid.287 Revised Article 9 validates such descriptions.288 Assuming
the "all assets" financing statement was filed according to Revised
Article 9's choice-of-law and filing rules, it would, without more, perfect
the creditor's interest in whatever assets were adequately described in
the debtor's security agreement as of Revised Article 9's effective date.
c. Security Interests that Attach Post-effective Date
Revised section 9-705(a) describes the treatment of security
interests that only come into existence-attach-after Revised Article
9 becomes effective. If action other than the filing of a financing
statement is taken PED, and that action would have given the actor
priority over a lien creditor hadthe security interest attachedPED, then,
that action is effective to perfect a security interest that attaches within
one year after Revised Article 9 becomes effective. The interest perfects
when it attaches. But the interest becomes unperfected if the creditor>
fails to re-perfect it according to Revised Article 9's perfection rules
within one year after Revised Article 9 becomes effective. This tracks
revised section 9-703(c)'s one-year rule but applies the rule to security
interests that only attach post-effective date.
Although the comments do not give an example of this rule, one
commentator notes:
The bailee with notice example cited in Example 2 in the Official
Comments to section 9-703 could serve as well to illustrate the
operation of section 9-705(a): to the extent the secured party is
relying on a pre-effective date notice to a bailee for perfection as to
then existing and thereafter acquired collateral (as might be the case
285. {d. Ii 9-704(2)(B).
286. {d. Ii 9-704 em!., Example.
287. See. e.g.. Gill v. United States (In re Boogie Enters.), 866 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1989).
288. R.U.C.C. Ii 9-504(2).
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under certain mortgage warehousing arrangements), it benefits from
the same one-year grace period as to both existing and future
collateral within which period it must secure the bailee's authentica-
tion ofa record acknowledging that it holds for the secured party.289
Revised section 9-705(a) governs a vel)' narrow band of security
interests. Its rule is limited to interests that attach post-effective date and
for which perfection would be achieved through an act other than the
filing of a financing statement.
3. Post-effective Date Amendments to PED Financing Statements
Section 9-707 describes how a creditor amends a PED filed
financing statement. It provides that once Revised Article 9 becomes
effective, its rules govern amendments with one vel)' limited exception,
termination of a PED financing statement for which no in lieu initial
financing statement has been filed. 290 So, the creditor who wants to add
or delete collateral or continue the effectiveness ofa financing statement
filed PED must comply with Revised Article 9's amendment and
continuation rules.
A creditor can amend a PED statement post-effective date one of
three ways.
289. Smith, supra note 215, at 1341.
290. R.U.C.C. § 9-707(e) provides:
Whether or not the law of this State governs perfection of a security interest, the
effectiveness of a pre-effective date financing statement filed in this State may be
terminated after this [Act] takes effect by filing a termination statement in the office
in which the pre-effective-date financing statement is filed, unless an initial
financing statement that satisfies Section 9-706(c) has been filed in the office
specified by the law ofthe jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in Part 3 as
the office in which to file a financing statement.
According to Sigman and Smith, this exception regarding termination statements is more limited
than would appear at first glance. Notonly is the exception not available when the creditor has filed
an in lieu statement according to Revised Article 9's rules, but it is not
available ifthe Pre-Effective-Date Financing Statement is on file in an office that is
not the filing office specified by the Post-Effective-Date domestic law of that
jurisdiction as the office in which to perfect by filing. Indeed, the alternative
location for filing a termination statement might well be available only in cases
where the Pre-Effective-Date Financing Statement is on file in a statewide central
office.
Harry C. Sigman & Edwin E. Smith, Revised u.c.c. Article 9' Transition Rules: Insuring a Soft
Landing - Part II, 55 BuS. LAW. 1763, 1777 (2000). It may be easier to comply with Revised
Article 9's rules regarding termination statements than to figure out when and if the exception
applies.
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I) If the PED financing statement is filed in the office
required by Revised Article 9 to perfect the creditor's
interest, the creditor can simply file its amendment in that
office.
2) If the PED financing statement was not filed in the
office Revised Article 9 would require, the creditor can file
the amendment concurrently with or after the creditor has
filed in that office an initial financing statement complying
with revised section 9-706(c).
3) Finally, the creditor can amend by filing in that office
an initial financing statement that provides the information as
amended and that complies with revised section 9-706(c).
4. Persons Entitled to File Initial Financing Statement or Continua-
tion Statement
The transition rules authorize a person to file an initial financing
statement or a continuation statement under Part 7 if the secured party
of record authorizes the filing and it is necessary to continue the
effectiveness of a PED financing statement or to perfect or to continue
to perfect a security interest.291 The debtor is not required to authorize
the filing because filings pursuant to Part 7 of Revised Article 9
normally act to continue the effectiveness of a financing statement
already authorized by the debtor.292
Part 7 also states transition priority rules. According to revised
V.C.C. section 9-709(a), generally, Revised Article 9's priority rules
govern all priority disputes. They do not apply if the parties' relative
priority was established before Revised Article 9 became effective.293
Be careful about what this exception is really saying. It is NOT saying
enactment ofRevised Article 9 freezes the parties' relative priority as of
its effective date. It is simply establishing that enactment of Revised
Article 9 does not, without more, affect their PED priority: "[T]he mere
taking effect ofthis Article does not of itselfadversely affect the priority
ofconflicting claims to collateraI."294 Post-effective date action by one
creditor can alter PED priorities. For example, assume both creditors
291. R.U.c.c. § 9-708.
292. Id. § 9-708 cmt.
293. Id. § 9-708.
294. Id. § 9-708 cmt. I.
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were unperfected under old Article 9 as of Revised Article 9's effective
date. Creditor l's interest, as the first to attach, would have priority.295
If, post-effective date, Creditor 2 were to file a financing statement to
perfect its interest according to Revised Article 9's rules, it would have
priority over Creditor 1 as the first to file or perfect.296 As the Official
Comments explain, "by taking the affirmative step of filing a financing
statement, SP-2 established anew the relative priority ofthe conflicting
claims after the effective date. Thus, this Article determines priority.
SP-2's security interest has priority under Section 9_322(a)(l)."297
When would relative priorities be established before Revised
Article 9 takes effect? The obvious example is of two perfected PED
creditors but even this is subject to change post-effective date. Assume
Creditor I had priority under old Article 9. Post-effective date, it fails
to properly continue its PED financing statement. Under Revised Article
9, when a creditor fails to timely continue the effectiveness of its filed
financing statement, the security interest "is deemed never to have been
perfected as against a purchaser ofthe collateral for value.,,298 A secured
creditor is a purchaser. Creditor 2, ifit gave value, would have priority
over Creditor I (assuming Creditor 2's PED financing statement
remained effective).
The comments give another, more complicated illustration. They
pose SPI, PED, with a security interest in the debtor's (D) lottery
winnings.299 SPI files against D's accounts. (SPI is unperfected
because a debtor's right to lottery winnings were a general intangible
under old Article 9.) Later but still PED, SP2 takes and properly
perfects a security interest in D's lottery winnings by filing on D's
general intangibles. Before Revised Article 9 takes effect, SP2 has
priority over SPI. Once Revised Article 9 becomes effective, SPI's
filing on accounts would perfect its interest, assuming it was filed in the
right place. And it filed first. Although it would have priority ifRevised
Article 9 controlled, old Article 9 governs because the relative priority
ofthe parties' claims were established before Revised Article 9 became
effective. Therefore, SP2 retains its priority post-effective date. (It is
also possible to rationalize this result by saying that SPI 's earlier-filed
financing statement did not become effective until Revised Article 9
295. u.c.e. § 9-312(5)(b).
296. R.U.C.C. § 9-708 emt. I, Example 3.
297. Id.
298. Id. § 9-515(e).
299. Id. § 9-709 emt. I, Example 4.
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became effective and therefore, even though it had filed first, its filing
was ineffective at the time it was made.)
Revised section 9-709(b) is captioned "Priority if security interest
becomes enforceable under Section 9-203." This subsection is limited
to security interests that attach post-effective date. It provides:
For purposes of Section 9-322(a), the priority ofa security interest
that becomes enforceable under Section 9-203 of this [Act] dates
from the time this [Act] takes effect if the security interest is
perfected under this [Act] by the filing of a financing statement
before this [Act] takes effect which would not have been effective
to perfect the security interest under [fonner Article 9].
Freely translated, if what the creditor did PED would satisfy Revised
Article 9's perfection requirements but not fonner Article 9's require-
ments, the creditor's priority date for post-effective date security
interests is Revised Article 9's effective date. So, if Revised Article 9
became effective in State X on July 1, 2001, and as of that date, the
creditor had complied with Revised Article 9's steps for perfection,
priority for its post-effective date security interests would date from July
1,2001.
Of course, this subsection would not be complete without an
exception and an exception there is. The rule "does not apply to
conflicting security interests each of which is perfected by the filing of
such a financing statement.,,300 So, the priority date for security interests
that attach post-effective date is not Revised Article 9's effective date if
they all became perfected by a PED filing that complied with Revised
Article 9 but not old Article 9. In that case, Revised Article 9's first-to-
file-or-perfect rule governs. So, whoever, PED, was the first to do what
Revised Article 9 required for perfection will have priority to security
interests that attach post-effective date.
The comments give the example oftwo creditors who filed PED on
instruments.30' Old Article 9 required possession to perfect an interest
in instruments.302 Revised Article 9 penn its filing. 303 A rule establishing
Revised Article 9's effective date as their priority date would not give
300. Id. § 9-709(b).
301. Id. § 9-709 cm!. 2. Example 7.
302. U.c.c. § 9-304( I).
303. R.U.C.C. § 9-312(a) ("A security interest in chattel paper. negotiable documents.
instruments. or investment property may be perfected by filing.").
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one creditor priority over the other. Resort to Revised Article 9's
priority rules and revised section 9-322(a)'s first-to-file-or-perfect rule
does. The first creditor who filed PED will have priority under Revised
Article 9.
VIII. ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS - OEFAULT
A. INTRODUCTION
Part 6 of Revised Article 9 is the counterpart to Article 9's Part 5.
Part 5 of Article 9 consists of 7 provisions. Part 6 of Revised Article 9
weighs in at 28 provisions. One supposes that old Article 9's general
exhortation to secured creditors to proceed in a commercially reasonable
fashion was too mushy, too fluid, too fraught with peril. Part 6 of
Revised Article 9 is very concrete. It states some very clear rules and
supplies some very clear forms, all ofwhich are very clearly intended to
provide safe harbors for the creditor. For instance, in non-consumer
transactions, a notice of default sent 10 or more days before the earliest
time ofdisposition is per se reasonable.304 Revised U.C.C. section 9-613
provides sample notice forms for private and public sales. If creditors
(or their attorneys) fill in the information the form elicits, they can enjoy
uninterrupted sleep at night, knowing they have provided the necessary
information.305
Revised Article 9 also identifies the parties who must receive
notice of the disposition.306 Along with the debtor (owner of the
collateral), the foreclosing creditor must notify all secondary obligors,307
all creditors on file (as defined) claiming an interest in the collateral and
all creditors (as defined) with interests in the collateral perfected by
compliance with another notice system.
Despite its length and clarity, Part 6 fails to state clear rules on
certain key issues. For instance, it is deafeningly silent on when a sale
is a private or public sale. It is all very nice to have safe harbor forms
for each type of sale, but without guidance about when to use which
304. Id. § 9-612(b). "The 10-day notice period in subsection (b) is intended to be a 'safe
harbor' and not a minimum requirement. To qualify for the 'safe harbor,' the notification must be
sent after default." Id. § 9-612 cmt. 3.
305. Id. § 9-613(5).
306. Id. § 9-611(c).
307. Id. § 9-102(a)(71) defines "secondary obligor" to include sureties and others having
a right of recourse.
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fonn (and when the creditor can bid), the creditor is hardly "safe."308 In
the consumer arena, Revised Article 9 refuses to state a safe harbor rule
regarding what is a reasonable time for notice ofa disposition.309 In the
consumer context as well, it declines to state a rule governing the effect
of creditor noncompliance with Part 6's rules.3lO
Moreover, ifcreditors think Revised Article 9 liberates them from
mushy post-default standards ofconduct, they need to think again. First,
Revised Article 9 posits the same open-ended, overarching requirement
that every aspect of the disposition - method, manner, time, place and
tenns - be commercially reasonable.311 Second, Revised Article 9
defines "good faith" to include not only "honesty in fact," but "the
observance of reasonable commercial standards offair dealing."312 The
Code imposes an obligation of good faith in the perfonnance and
enforcement ofevery contract and duty.313 This means the creditor must
observe reasonable commercial standards offairdealing when itdeclares
a default or seeks to collect or enforce an obligation.
B. MAJOR INNOVAnONS IN COMMERCIAL DEBTOR CONTEXT
In the interests of space and time, the following discussion is
limited to the most important changes wrought by Part 6 in the commer-
cial debtor context. The next section, Section IX, discusses Revised
Article 9's treatment ofconsumers, including its special consumer rules
in the post-default phase of a secured transaction.
1. Parties the Foreclosing Creditor Must Notify - Revised Section 9-
611
Revised section 9-611 imposes a new, significant duty on the
foreclosing creditor to notifY other interested claimants of the disposi-
tion. Fonner Article 9 only required the creditor to give notice to those
308. And the creditor cannot finesse the situation by following Mark Twain's advice that
"when you come to a fork in the road, you should take it." A sale is either a public sale or a private
sale. It can't be both. Moreover, notice for a private sale does not comply with the requirements
for notice ofa public sale and vice versa.
309. R.U.C.C. § 9-612(b).
310. Id. § 9-626(b).
311. Id. § 9-61 O(b).
312. Id. § 9-102(a)(43).
313. u.c.c. § 1-203.
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who gave notice to it of their claim.314 Revised Article 9 imposes a duty
on the foreclosing creditor to search for outstanding claims to the
collateral, both in the U.c.e. files and under separate state and federal
notice systems. .
The provision begins by defining "notification date" because it
uses that moment in time to limit the foreclosing creditor's search and
notification duties. The notification date is the date at which the creditor
sends an authenticated notification of disposition to the debtor and any
secondary obligor, or the time when the debtor and any secondary
obligor waive their right to notification.315
According to revised section 9-611 (b), the creditor must send an
authenticated notification of disposition to:
I) the debtor;316
2) any secondary obligor;3!7
3) everyone who has notified the creditor of its interest before the
notification date;318 .
4) anyone on file, secured creditor or lienholder, who 10 days before the
notification date, held a security interest in the col1ateral perfected by a
filed financing statement that identifies the colIateral, is indexed under the
debtor's name as the creditor knows it, and is filed in the office where a
financing statement regarding that debtor would currently befiled;3!9
and
5) other secured creditors, who, IO-days before the notification date, held
a security interest in the collateral perfected by compliance with a separate
public notice system established by statute, regulation or treaty.320
The comments explain why the revisors chose to increase the
foreclosing creditor's notification duties:
314. U.e.e. § 9-504(3) (in non-consumer cases, "notification shall be sent to any other
secured party from whom the secured party has received (before sending his notification to the
debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in
the collateral").
315. R.U.e.e. § 9-611 (a)(I )-(2).
316. Id. § 9-611(c)(I).
317. Id. § 9-61 1(c)(2).
318. Id. §9-611(c)(3)(A).
319. Id. § 9-61 I(c)(3)(B}(emphasis added). The foreclosing creditor fulfills its notification
duty by notifying those who have given public notice (filed their financing statements) according
to Revised Article 9's rules. The PED creditor should file its "in lieu" statement immediately to
insure notice from (or rights against) the foreclosing creditor.
320. Id. § 9-611 (c)(3)(C).
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Many of the problems arising from dispositions ofcollateral
encumbered by multiple security interests can be ameliorated or
solved by informing all secured parties of an intended disposition
and affording them the opportunity to work with one another. To
this end, subsection (c)(3)(B) expands the duties ofthe foreclosing
secured party to include the duty to notify (and the corresponding
burden ofsearching the files to discover) certain competing secured
parties. The subsection imposes a search burden that in some cases
may be greater than the pre-1972 burden on foreclosing secured
parties but certainly is more modest than that faced by a new
secured lender.
To determine who is entitled to notification, the foreclosing
secured party must determine the proper office for fi ling a financing
statement as of a particular date, measured by reference to the
"notification date," .... This determination requires reference to
the choice-of-Iaw provisions of Part 3. The secured party must
ascertain whether any financing statements covering the collateral
and indexed under the debtor's name, as the name existed as ofthat
date, in fact were filed in that office. The foreclosing creditor
generally need not noti(y secured parties whose effective financing
statement may have become more difficult to locate because of
changes in the location ofthe debtor, proceeds rules, or changes in
the debtor's name. 321
Revised section 9-611 (e) creates a safe harbor for the creditor in
recognition of filing office delays. The creditor generally satisfies its
search and notification duties "if it requests a search from the proper
office at least 20 but no more than 30 days before sending notification
to the debtor" and all those identified on the search report.322
For some debtors, Revised Article 9 may generate mountains of
filings in a single filing location. This might make the creditor's search
and notification duties overwhelming in some cases.
2. Partial Strict Foreclosure - Revised section 9-620
Along with a creditor's acceptance ofcollateral injull satisfaction
of the debt owing (also known as "strict foreclosure"), revised section
9-620 recognizes the possibility of accepting collateral in partial
satisfaction of the obligation owing but only in non-consumer transac-
321. R.U.C.C. § 9-611 emt. 4.
322.1d.
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lions. According to revised section 9-620(a), a creditor "may accept
collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures ... if. ..
(1) the debtor agrees to the terms of the acceptance in a record
authenticated after default ... ," and (2) no one entitled to receive
notification ofthe creditor's proposal objects within the requisite time.323
Acceptance of collateral in partial satisfaction of the debt requires the
debtor's express consent. "The prohibition against implied consent ...
presumably results from a heightened concern that through mere silence
a debtor should not lose its property and also remain liable for an
amount of debt calculated by the creditor in its sole discretion."324
Beyond requiring a debtor's express post-default consent, though, the
rules regarding acceptance of collateral in partial satisfaction of the
obligation basically mirror those for acceptance of collateral in full
satisfaction of the debt.325
In addition to the debtor, the creditor must notify certain other
interested parties ofits proposal to accept the collateral. Revised section
9-621 lists the parties. Not surprisingly, it strongly resembles the classes
ofparties entitled to receive notice ofthe foreclosing creditor's intended
disposition, e.g., secured creditors and lienholders who have notified the
creditor, creditors on file with conflicting claims to the collateral, and
other creditors who have given public notice of their interest in the
collateral by complying with a separate statute, treaty or regulation.326
For acceptances in partial satisfaction ofthe debt, the creditor must also
send its proposal to any secondary obligor.327 Any party can object. If
an objection is timely made,328 the creditor must dispose ofthe collateral
pursuant to revised section 9-610.
The comments explain that the enforcing creditor has no safe
harbor that excuses it
323. Id. § 9-620(a), (b), (c)(I). R.U.C.C. § 9-620(b) eliminates constructive strict
foreclosure by requiring the creditor either to send a proposal for strict foreclosure or to consent to
the debtor's acceptance in an authenticated record. Id. § 9-620(b).
324. TIMOTHY R. ZINNECKER, THE DEFAULT PROVISIONS OF REVISED ARTICLE 9, at 125
(ABA 1999).
325. R.U.C.C. § 9-620 cmt. 3.
326. Id. § 9-621 (a).
327. Id. § 9-621(b).
328. Id. § 9-620(d) describes when a notification ofobjection is effective. The time period
is short. For instance, for those receiving notice of the creditor's proposal pursuant to R.U.C.C. §
9-621, the secured party must receive the notice ofobjection within 20 days after the secured party
sentthe proposal. R.U.C.C. § 9-620(d)( I). This is less than 20 days because the clock starts ticking
when the creditor sends the proposal and the creditor must receive notice of the objection within
20 days of that date.
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from notifying certain secured parties and other lienholders. This
is because, unlike Section 9-610, which requires that disposition of
collateral be commercially reasonable, Section 9-620 permits the
debtor and secured party to set the amount ofcredit the debtor will
receive for the collateral subject only to the requirement of good
faith. An effective acceptance discharges subordinate security
interests and other subordinate liens.329
In other words, the requirement of a commercially reasonable sale
protects the interests of creditors who do not receive notice of the
enforcing creditor's intended disposition. No comparable protection
exists when the creditor accepts collateral in satisfaction of the debt,
fully or partially. Consequently, those entitled to notice who do not
receive it have the right to recover damages for any loss suffered as a
result of their failure to receive notice.330
With partial strict foreclosure, the parties are fixing the debtor's
deficiency liability by agreement. They are detennining the value ofthe
collateral and hence how much to deduct from the indebtedness owing.
No disposition ofthe collateral occurs. Beyond the requirements ofthe
debtor's express assent and notice to the various other parties affected
by the process, are there any other checks on the creditor who proposes
partial strict foreclosure? Yes. First, as noted above, it is not available
in consumer transactions.331 Second, the creditor has a duty of good
faith which cannot be disclaimed:
Thus, a proposal and acceptance made under this section in bad
faith would not be effective. For example, a secured party's
proposal to accept marketable securities worth $J,000 in full
satisfaction of indebtedness in the amount of $100, made in the
hopes that the debtor might inadvertently fail to object, would be
made in bad faith. On the other hand, in the normal case proposals
and acceptances should not be second-guessed on the basis of the
"value" ofthe collateral involved. Disputes about valuation or even
a clear excess of collateral value over the amount of obligations
satisfied do not necessarily demonstrate the absence of good
faith. 332
329.1d. § 9-621 emt. 2.
330.1d. § 9-625(b).
331. Id. § 9-620(g).
332. Id. § 9-620 emt. 11.
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Appraisal ofthe collateral by an independent third party chosen by both
the debtor and creditor would presumably help to insulate the agreement
from subsequent attack. Ifdone fairly, partial strict foreclosure wi II help
the debtor. It eliminates the need for creditor disposition and thereby
reduces the creditor's costs (and potential exposure). That, in turn,
should reduce the debtor's deficiency liability.
Revised section 9-622 spells out the legal consequences of a
creditor's "acceptance of collateral."
I. It discharges the obligation to the extent of the
debtor's consent;
2. it transfers all the debtor's rights in the collateral to
the creditor;
3. it discharges the security interest or agricultural lien
subject to the debtor's consent and any subordinate security
interest or lien; and
4. finally, it terminates any other subordinate interest.
The above consequences occur even if the creditor fails to comply with
revised sections 9-620 and 9-621.333
3. Unreasonably Low Foreclosure Sale Proceeds: Revised Section 9-
615(f)
Revised Article 9 states a special rule for dispositions to the
secured creditor, a person related to334 the secured party, or a secondary
obligor ifthe disposition realizes significantly less than what would have
been realized by a complying disposition to someone other than the
secured party, someone related to the secured party or a secondary
obligor. According to revised section 9-615(t), "the surplus or defi-
ciency following a disposition is calculated based on the amount of
proceeds that would have been realized in a disposition complying with
this part to a transferee other than the secured party, a person related to
the secured party, or a secondary obligor." According to the comments,
this rule is designed to compensate for the creditor's lack of incentive to
maximize proceeds when it is buying the collateral itselfor seIling it to
a related party or secondary obligor who is liable to it in any event.
333: !d. § 9-622(b).
334. !d. § 9-102(a)(62)-(a)(63) defines "person related to."
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The debtor has the burden to prove that the proceeds realized were
significantly below the range of proceeds a complying sale to someone
else would have generated.335 Exactly how the debtor can meet its
burden of proof here, how courts will administer this rule and how
debtors in default can afford such litigation are left unanswered. The
comments suggest that the creditor's receipt of a low price does not
necessarily indicate creditor noncompliance with Part 6. It "may suggest
the need for greater judicial scrutiny.,,336
4. Rebuttable Presumption Approachfor Non-Complying Non-Con-
sumer Dispositions: Revised section 9-626
Revised section 9-626 states a series of rules governing actions to
collect a deficiency or surplus in non-consumer transactions. It is a
linguistic labyrinth that codifies the rebuttable presumption rule for non-
consumer transactions. Stripped to its essentials, revised section 9-626
provides that
• The secured creditor is not required to prove compliance
with Part 6 unless the debtor or a secondary obligor raises the
issue.337
• If placed in issue, the creditor has the burden to prove its
compliance.338
• If the creditor does not meet this burden, the debtor or
secondary obligor's liability is limited to an amount by which
the sum of the secured obligation, expenses and attorney's
fees exceeds the greater of
a the proceeds of the creditor's collection, enforce-
ment, disposition of acceptance; or
a the amount of proceeds the creditor would have
realized had it complied.339
• The amount of proceeds the creditor would have received
had it complied is equal to the sum of the creditor's debt,
335. R.U.C.C. § 9-626(a)(5).
336. Id. § 9-615 cmt. 6.
337. Id. § 9-626(a)( I).
338. Id. § 9-626(a)(2).
339. Id. § 9-626(a)(3).
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expenses and attorney's fees unless the creditor proves the
amount is less than that.340
The comments caution that revised section 9-626 only applies to a
creditor's failure to comply with Part 6's rules regarding collection,
enforcement, disposition or acceptance.341 So, revised section 9·626's
rule does not address or sanction a wrongful repossession. Instead,
revised section 9-625(b)'s provisions requiring compensation for actual
loss suffered govern.
5. Warranties on Disposition & Disclaimer ofWarranty Rules:
Revised Section 9-6JO(d)-(f)
Unless disclaimed, the secured creditor gives the same warranties
that would accompany a comparable voluntary disposition of the
collateral.342 So, the creditor who disposes of collateral by sale gives
whatever warranties, by operation of law, accompany a voluntary sale.
The creditor who disposes of collateral by leasing it gives whatever
warranties accompany a lease of goods. The creditor who disposes of
collateral by license gives the warranties a licensor gives at law. The
statute mentions warranties regarding title, possession, quiet enjoyment
and the like. Does "and the like" include the § 2-314 implied warranty
of merchantability? That is, does the foreclosing creditor make any
implied representations regarding the quality of the goods sold? Only
merchants who deal in goods of the kind give the § 2-314 implied
warranty ofmerchantability. The bank who conducts a foreclosure sale
does not deal in goods of the kind and therefore does not give the
implied warranty ofmerchantability. A seller-creditor, e.g., a car dealer,
would give the warranty if it sold a repossessed car.343 This would be
big news for those who acquire property through a forced disposition but
for the factthatthe foreclosing merchant-creditor can disclaim or modify
these warranties and one assumes any well-represented creditor will do
so. Once again, those unacquainted with Revised Article 9 may
experience a baptism by fire.
340. !d. § 9-626(a)(4).
341. R.U.C.C.§9-626cmt.2.
342. !d. § 9-610(d).
343. The language "and the like" establishes that law other than Revised Article 9 gives rise
to other statutory or implied warranties. R.U.C.C. § 9-610 cmt. II. That other law also controls
the effectiveness of attempted disclaimers. !d.
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Revised section 9-61 O(e) describes how the creditor can validly
disclaim or modify the warranties recognized in subsection (d). The
creditor can disclaim or modify the warranties given on disposition in
any manner recognized as effective for a comparable voluntary
disposition.344 So, returning to the example ofa car dealer, the car dealer
as foreclosing creditor could disclaim the implied warranty by following
the relevant disclaimer rules stated in § 2-316. A foreclosing creditor
can also disclaim by "communicating to the purchaser a record evidenc-
ing the contract for disposition and including an express disclaimer
...."345 Finally, a record stating the seller-creditor does not give any
warranty regarding title or quiet enjoyment, etc., is sufficient.346 This
resembles Article 2's rule that statements like "as is," "with all faults"
or similar language that in common understanding calls the buyer's
attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that the seller
gives no implied warranty are sufficient to disclaim the implied
warranties.347
C. WAIVER
Freedom of contract is a fundamental principle undergirding the
U.C.C. With some exceptions, parties may vary its provisions by
agreement.348 But "in the context of rights and duties after default, our
legal system traditionally has looked with suspicion on agreements that
limit the debtor's rights and free the secured party of its duties .... The
context ofdefault offers great opportunity for overreaching."349 Former
Article 9 barred debtor waiver ofcertain creditor duties or certain debtor
rights in the default context.350 Revised Article 9 significantly expands
the Iist ofunwaivable debtor rights and creditor duties.35 I The expansion
occurs in several ways. First, Revised Article 9 makes non-waivable
certain rights and duties that were at least theoretically waivable under
344. Id. § 9-610(e)(I).
345. Id. § 9-61O(e)(2).
346. Id. § 9-61 O(t).
347. u.e.e. § 2-316(3)(a).
34~. u.e.e. § 1-102.
349. R.U.e.e. § 9-602 cmt. 2.
350. U.e.e. § 9-501(3). These include u.e.e. §§ 9-502(2) and 9-504(2) (creditor's duty
to account for surplus proceeds of collateral); u.e.e. §§ 9-504(3) and 9-505( I) (creditor's duties
regarding disposition ofcollateral); u.e.e. § 9-506 (debtor's right to redeem collateral); and U.e.e.
§ 9-507 (creditor's liability for failure to comply with Part 5 of Article 9).
351. R.U.e.e. § 9-602 & cmt. 3.
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fonner Article 9.352 Second, it imposes additional non-waivable duties
on the secured creditor and gives debtors additional non-waivable
rights.353 Finally, it clarifies who enjoys these nonwaivable rights.
Fonner section 9-501(3) gave the anti-waiver protection to the
"debtor." Under Revised Article 9, the restrictions on waiver apply both
to "debtors" and "obligors,,,3s4 thereby "resolv[ing] a question under
fonner Article 9 as to whether secondary obligors, assuming that they
were 'debtors' for purposes offonner Part 5, were pennitted to waive,
... rights and duties under that part.,,3SS
IX. SPECIAL CONSUMER RULES
A. INTRODUCTION
Creating consensus on consumer rules for unifonn laws has proved
elusive. Revised Article 9 is no exception.
An important fact in regard to consumer provisions is that the
Conference has not been particularly successful in securing
adoptions of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code which contains
many consumer protective provisions similar to those being
proposed by consumer groups for Article 9. The experience with
the Consumer Credit Code teaches us that it is very difficult to
reach a national consensus on consumer issues which is acceptable
in the various states. The differences in social, economic, and
political conditions in the states are sufficiently great that rules that
in one state are seen as insufficiently protective of consumer
interests are seen in another as unjustified interference with market
forces. Therefore, the drafting participants must recognize that the
question of coverage of consumer issues in Article 9 involves not
onlyajudgment as to the best substantive rule, but also ajudgment
regarding whether there is sufficient consensus on the appropriate
substantive rule outside the Conference and the American Law
Institute (ALI) that a decision made by the Conference and the ALI
would be acceptable. Therefore, provisions which the sponsoring
352. Under former Article 9 (U.c.c. § 9-503) and Revised Article 9 (R.U.C.C. § 9-
609(b)(2», a creditor can only exercise its self-help remedy if it can do so without breaching the
peace. Revised Article 9 makes that duty non-waivable. R.U.C.C. § 9-602(6).
353. For the full list of new rights and duties, see R.U.C.C. § 9-602 cmt. 3.
354. R.U.C.C. § 9-602.
355. Id. cmt. 4.
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organizations believe substantively desirable might nevertheless not
be included in Article 9 because ofenactability concems.3S6
And so, rather than state a substantively desirable but unenactable
consumer protection rule, Revised Article 9 frequently states a rule for
non-consumer goods transactions and defers to the courts of each state
to develop a companion consumer rule in grand (unpredictable) common
law style.3S7 For instance, revised section 9-626(a) essentially codifies
the rebuttable presumption approach for non-complying dispositions "in
actions[s] arising from a transaction other than a consumer transaction
...." Revised Article 9 neither approves nor disapproves the "rebutta-
ble presumption" rule for consumer transactions. "The limitations ofthe
rules in subsection (a) to transactions other than consumer transactions
is intended to leave to the court the determination ofthe proper rules in
consumer transactions. The court may not infer from that limitation the
nature of the proper rule in consumer transactions and may continue to
apply established approaches.,,3s8 In a similar spirit, Revised Article 9
abolishes the transformation rule for non-consumer goods
transactions,3S9 and delegates to the courts the task of determining the
proper approach for consumer-goods transactions.360
8. DEFINITIONS
Revised Article 9 defines "consumer debtor," "consumer goods,"
"consumer-goods transaction," "consumer obligor" and "consumei'
transaction." "Debtor" means the person having an interest in the
collateral, other than a security interest, e.g., "debtor" includes the owner
of the collatera1.361 A consumer debtor is. the "debtor" in a consumer
transaction. A "consumer obligor" is an individual (human being) who
356. Report of the Consumer Issues Subcommittee of the U.c.c. Article 9 Drafting
Committee (issued May 29, 1996), reprinted in 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 332. 332 (1996),
quoted in Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Consumer Provisions in Revised Article 9, 74 CHiC-KENT L.
REV. 1255, 1256 (1999). See also Diann M. Bartek & H. Joseph Acosta, The Effect ofRevised
Article 9 on Consumer Transactions, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 571,587 (2000); Donald J. Rapson,
Default & Enforcement ofSecurity Interests under RevisedArticle 9 (Symposium on Revised VCC
Article 9), 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893. 897 n.23 (1999).
357. One commentator describes these as "we punt" provisions. Jean Braucher, Deadlock:
Consumer Transactions under Revised Article 9. 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 83,95 (1999).
358. R.U.c.c. § 9-626(b).
359. Id. §9-103(f).
360. Id. § 9-1 03(h).
361. Id. § 9-102(a)(28)(A).
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incurs the obligation primarily for family, household, or personal
reasons. A "consumer transaction" exists if
• an individual incurs an obligation primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes;
• the security interest secures that obligation; and
• the obligor acquires the collateral primarily for personal,
family or household purposes.362
A consumer-goods transaction is a consumer transaction in which
the individual incurs the obligation principally for personal, family or
household reasons and the obligation is secured by a security interest in
consumer goods.363 Finally, in a transaction involving consumer goods,
even though the obligation is secured by a security interest in consumer
goods, the individual does not incur the obligation principally for
personal, family or household reasons.364
Why all this complexity? Because Revised Article 9 states
different rules depending on whether the transaction is a consumer
transaction,365 a consumer-goods transaction366 ora transaction involving
consumer goods.367 Consumer-goods transactions involve goods used for
personal, family or household purposes that secure an obligation
incurred for personal, family or household reasons. The collateral
involved in a "consumer transaction" is not limited to consumer goods.
It includes any collateral used primarily for personal, family or house-
hold purposes, e.g., a debtor's interest in a mutual fund account held by
a brokerage firm, to secure an obligation incurred for family, personal
or household purposes. In a transaction involving consumer goods, an
362. ld. § 9-102(a)(26).
363. ld. § 9-1 02(a)(24).
364. Benfield, supra note 327, at 1260. In developing this tripartite division. Professor
Benfield cited to R.U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(27). Id. at n.14. Whatever that subsection may have
discussed originally, it now defines "continuation statement." Even though Revised Article 9 does
not specifically define "transaction involving consumer goods," an individual can secure a business
obligation by granting a security interest in her consumer assets. The rules regarding consumer-
goods transactions would not apply.
365. E.g., R. U.c.e. § 9-1 08(e)(description requirement for security agreement in consumer
transaction involving consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities account, or a commodity
account); R.U.e.c. § 9-109(d)( 13) (deposits accounts excluded as original collateral in consumer
transaction); R.U.e.c. § 9-620(g) (no "partial strict foreclosure" in consumer transactions).
366. Id. § 9-1 03(g) (no position on whether transformation rule applies to consumer-goods
transactions);id. § 9-614 (form and contentofnotice ofdisposition in consumer-goods transactions).
367. Id. § 9-625(c) (statutory damages for creditor's failure to comply with post-default
rules).
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individual grants a security interest in his or her consumer asset(s) to
secure a business debt/obligation.
In a word, E =MC2, and under Revised Article 9,
• consumer transaction = consumer obligation secured by
consumer collateral;
• consumer-goods transaction = consumer obligation secured
by consumer goods;
and
• transaction involving consumer goods = non-consumer
obligation secured by consumer goods
C. POST-DEFAULT CONSUMER RULES
1. Introduction
By way of handy reference, the Official Comments to revised
section 9-101 summarize Revised Article 9's most significant innova-
tions. Official Comment 4.j. is entitled "Consumer Goods, Consumer-
Goods Transactions, and Consumer Transactions." It lists many if not
all of Revised Article 9's consumer rules (or their absence on a given
issue). Not surprisingly, most ofthe consumer-based discussion occurs
in Part 6 which addresses the post-default situation. For instance, the
comment notes that revised section 9-612'sID-day safe harbor rule for
notices of disposition does not apply to consumer transactions.368
Revised section 9-613 's rules regarding the content and form of notice
ofdisposition do not apply to a consumer-goods transaction.369 Instead,
revised section 9-614 states special content and notice requirements for
consumer-goods transactions and provides a safe-harbor, "plain English"
form.370
The creditor who seeks to collect a deficiency in a consumer-goods
transaction must provide the debtor with a detailed explanation of how
it calculated the deficiency.371 Revised Article 9 bans partial strict
foreclosure in consumer-goods transactions presumably to protect
consumer obligors from expressly agreeing to low ball collateral values
368. Id. § 9-101 cmt.j.v.
369. Id. § 9-101 cmt.j.vi.
370. Id. § 9-101, cmt.j.vii.
371. R.U.C.C. § 9-616.
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and impliedly assuming high ball deficiency liability.372 It also requires
the creditor to dispose of consumer-goods collateral in certain cases
unless the debtor, in an authenticated post-def~ult record, has waived the
requirement of creditor disposition.373
2. Notice ofDisposition in Consumer-Goods Transactions: Revised
Section 9-614
Revised section 9-614 states special, additional rules for notices of
disposition involving consumer-goods transactions. (The relatively more
relaxed revised section 9-613 requirements apply to consumer transac-
tions not involving consumer-goods.) In addition to the requirements
stated in revised section. 9-613( 1),374 a consumer-goods transaction
notice must include "a description ofany liability for a deficiency ofthe
person to which the notification is sent, a telephone number" to call to
obtain the amount needed to redeem the collateral, and a phone number
or mailing address from which to obtain additional information
concerning the disposition and the obligation secured.375
As with non-consumer-goods transactions, Revised Article 9
contains a "safe harbor" notice form for consumer-goods transactions.376
The form notice is sufficient even if additional information appears at
the end ofthe form. 377 If the form notice contains errors in information
the form does not require, the notice is sufficient unless the e.rror is
misleading with respect to the debtor's rights.378
372. !d. § 9-620(g).
373. !d. § 9-620(e). R.U.C.e. § 9-620(e) basically tracks old U.c.e. § 9-505( I)'s
requirement of mandatory disposition by the creditor if the debtor has paid 60% of the cash price
in a pmsi transaction involving consumer goods, or 60% ofthe principal amount of the obligation
secured by a non-pmsi in consumer goods.
374. According to R.U.C.e. § 9-613( I), a valid notice must describe the debtor. the secured
party, and the collateral subject to intended disposition. In addition, it must also state
I) the intended method ofdisposition;
2) the debtor's right to an accounting ofthe unpaid indebtedness and the charge, if
any, for such an accounting; and
3) the time and place ofa public sale or the time after which any other disposition
is to be made.
All notices must comply with R.U.C.C. § 9-613( I). The notice ofdisposition for consumer-
goods transactions must include the additional information detailed by R.U.e.C. § 9-614.
375. R.U.e.e. § 9-614(1).
376. !d. § 9-614(3).
377. !d. § 9-614(4).
378. !d. § 9-614(5).
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Unlike revised section 9-613(3)(8), revised section 9-614 does not
specifically state that the notice is sufficient even though it contains
"minor errors that are not seriously misleading."
The failure to include a minor-errors protection for the
consumer-goods notice suggests that any error, no matter how
slight, will make the notice inadequate and subject the creditor to
substantial statutory damages recoverable for failure to comply with
the Article 9 foreclosure rules even in the absence of harm.
Whether such a result is justifiable is questionable. Errors might
occur as to any of the required information: the collateral may be
misdescribed (for example, 1999 automobile described as 1998):
debtor's or creditor's address may be misstated; the time ofa public
sale may be misstated; or the telephone number ofthe creditor may
be misstated. If the model year of a repossessed automobile is
misstated in the notice ofsale, it is very unlikely that any harm will
be caused by that alone. The debtor will almost certainly know that
there has been a mistake ....
No doubt the absence from section 9-614 ofthe minor-errors-
not-seriously-misleading defense suggests that courts should read
the statutory requirements for the consumer-goods notice more
strictly than they read the statutory requirements for the non-
consumer-goods notice. Also, there is no statement here, as there
is in the sections dealing with the absolute bar rule or the purchase
money rules that by silence, Article 9 intends neutrality on the issue
of whether a minor-errors-not-seriously-misleading defense is
available for errors in the consumer-goods notice. However,
neither of those considerations need lead courts to the conclusion
that every error, no matter how trivial, leads to liability. Surely
there must be some de minimis standard below which there is no
violation even though a technical error has occurred.J79
A creditor's failure to comply with revised section 9-614 can result
in significant creditor liability pursuant to revised section 9-625(c)(2)
which imposes damages in "an amount not less than the credit service
charge plus 10 percent of the principal amount of the obligation or the
time-price differential plus 10 percent ofthe cash price." As Professor
McDonnell points out, "[t]his sum can be very substantial in transactions
involving cars, boats and mobile homes.,,38o
379. Benfield. supra note 327, at 1270-71.
380. McDONNELL, supra note 92, at § 9-614, 444.
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Whether the creditor sends the notice of disposition within a
reasonable time is a question offact.381 In non-consumer transactions,
Revised Article 9 adopts a safe harbor rule of 10 days: "In a transaction
other than a consumer transaction, a notification of disposition sent
after default and 10 days or more before the earliest time ofdisposition
set forth in the notification is sent within a reasonable time before the
disposition."382 The comment characterizes the 1O-day rule as a safe
harbor and not as a minimum requirement.383 The comment further
instructs that the creditor must send the notice in a commercially
reasonable manner, explaining that such a requirement prevents the
creditor from "taking advantage ofthe safe harbor ...."384 So a creditor
cannot send notice by carrier pigeon via the Panama Canal. Beyond
saying it is a question offact, revised section 9-612 and its comments are
silent on what constitutes a reasonable time for notice in a consumer
transaction.
According to Professor Benfield,
[t]he failure of the statute to give approval to a ten-day notice in
consumer transactions might lead courts to find that a contracted for
ten-day period is manifestly unreasonable and not effective to fix
the time of notice: at least the failure to give statutory approval to
a ten-day notice invites such an argument on behalfof a consumer
debtor. Also, it should be noted that there is no provision here, as
there is elsewhere in the statute, that courts should not draw any
inferences as to the proper rule in consumer transactions from the
limitation of the ten-day safe-harbor provision to commercial
transactions. Therefore, it may be risky for a creditor to contract
for, or to give, only a ten-day notice of sale in consu~er transac-
tions.385
381. R.U.C.C. § 9-6 I2(a).
382. /d. § 9-6 12(b).
383. /d. § 9-612 emt.3.
384./d.
385. Benfield, supra note 327, at 1273-74.
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4. Special Notice ofDeficiency or Right to Surplus
In consumer-goods transactions, ifthe debtor is entitled to a surplus
or the consumer obligor is liable for a deficiency, the creditor may have
to send a special notice to the debtor or obligor.386 If required, this
special notice must provide a detailed explanation of how the creditor
calculated the surplus or deficiency.387
a. When Required
As a threshold matter, this special notice rule only applies if the
debtor is entitled to a surplus or the obligor is liable for a deficiency.388
So, the creditor has no duty whatsoever to account to the debtor or
obligor if there is no deficiency or surplus. Moreover, if the creditor
waives its right to a deficiency (in a record), it has no duty to account to
the consumer obligor.389
b. When Section 9-616 Notice Must be Sent
Assuming the debtor is entitled to a surplus, the creditor must send
the explanation of calculation of the surplus to the debtor
1) after the disposition, and
2) before or when it pays the debtor any surplus.390
Assuming the obligor is liable for a deficiency and the creditor has
not waived its right to pursue the obligor for that deficiency, the creditor
must send the obligor an explanation of calculation of the deficiency
either
• after the disposition, and
• before or when the creditor first makes written demand on
the obligor to pay the deficiency;391
or
386. R.U.C.C. § 9-616(b)(I).
387. /d. § 9-616(c).
388. /d. § 9-616(b).
389./d. § 9-616(b)(2).
390. /d. § 9-616(b)(1).
391. /d. § 9-616(b)(I).
192 .COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
• within 14 days after receiving a request to do SO.392
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c. Content of Explanation ofCalculation of Surplus or Deficiency
Revised section 9-616(c) details the required information for the
explanation and further states that the information must be provided in
the order listed. The creditor must include:
I. the aggregate amount of obligations secured by the
security interest and "if the amount reflects a rebate of
unearned interest or credit service charge, an indication of
that fact, calculated as of a specified date ...";393'
2. the amount of proceeds realized from the
disposition;394
3. the total amount ofobligations owing after deducting
the disposition proceeds;395
4. a listing of all. expenses, in the aggregate and by
type, including the costs of repossession, "holding,preparing
for disposition, processing, and disposing of the collateral,
and attorney's fees ., .";396
5. "the amount, in the aggregate or by type, and types
of credit, including rebates of interest or credit service
charges, to which the obligor is known to be entitled and
which are not [otherwise] reflected ..."397 and .
6. "the amount of the surplus or deficiency."398
d. Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Section 9-616 Explanation
Although revi~ed section 9-616 mandates this notice ifthe creditor
seeks to collect a deficiency (or the debtor is entitled to a surplus),the
creditor's failure to provide it does not trigger revised section 9-
625(c)(2)'s statutory penalty for creditor violations in consumer-goods
392. R.U.C.C. § 9-616(b)(2).
393. {d. § 9-616(c)(I).
394. {d. § 9-616(c)(2).
395. {d. § 9-616(c)(3).
396. /d. § 9-616(c)(4).
397. {d. § 9-616(c)(5).
398: {d. § 9-616(c)(6).
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transactions.399 The creditor who fails to send the required explanation
pursuant to revised section 9-616(b)(1) is liable for actual damages
caused (whatever those might be) plus $500 only ifthe creditor's failure
to comply is "part ofa pattern or consistent with a practice, ofnoncom-
pliance.,,4oo The creditor is liable for $500 plus actual damages suffered
if it fails to send the obligor liable for a deficiency a record waiving its
deficiency claim within 14 days of receiving a request.401
Note that revised section 9-616 does not apply if the creditor
chooses not to pursue the obligor for a deficiency. Waiving its defi-
ciency claim may protect the creditor more than the consumer debtor.
An explanation, if provided, might help the consumer (or consumer's
attorney) uncover flaws in the process which, if exposed, might entitle
the consumer obligor to statutory damages. Waiving the deficiency
claim might be cheaper to the creditor in the long run.
e. Evaluation of Section 9-616
Revised section 9-616's requirement ofa notice/explanation ofany
deficiency/surplus represents Revised Article 9's most significant
consumer innovation. Whether it will ultimately provide much in the
way of protection to consumers remains to be seen. Professor Benfield
writes:
At present there is no requirement that the creditor, when demand-
ing that the debtor pay the deficiency, give any accounting showing
how the deficiency was calculated. Consumer representatives in the
drafting process argued that creditors sometimes fail to properly
rebate unearned finance charges or refunds of insurance premiums
when making a claim for deficiency. They believed that requiring
399. R.U.C.C. § 9-625(c)(2) posits statutory damages for consumer-goods transactions in
"an amount not less than the credit service charge plus 10 percent of the principal amount of the
obligation or the time-price differential plus I0 percent of the cash price."
400. Id. § 9-625(e)(5).
401. Id. § 9-625(e)(6). The statutory language is confusing. It provides:
£T)he secured party shall: ... (2) in the case ofa consumer obligor who is liable for
a deficiency, within 14 days after receipt ofa request, send to the consumer obligor
a record waiving the secured party's right to a deficiency.
Id. § 9-616(b)(2). One assumes the word "request" refers to the obligor's request for an explanation
of his or her deficiency liability although it could refer to the obligor's request to the creditor to
confinn that it will not hold the obligor liable for any deficiency.
Would a consumer debtor ever bother to retain an attorney to enforce his or her rights under
R.U.C.C. § 9-616(b)(2)? Why kick agift horse in the mouth? Exoneration from deficiency liability
is a good thing. right? So. why pursue the creditor for failure to notifY the obligor ofthe good news?
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an accounting to the debtor after foreclosure would make creditors
more careful about giving rebates and refunds. Also they argued
that a notice showing the price received at a sale could alert
consumers to possible problems with the sale itself. Creditors, on
the other hand, believed that consumers would not gain enough
from an automatic post-sale disclosure to justify the additional
expense to creditors (and thus to borrowers) or to justify an
additional statutory requirement for which there would be statutory
penalties for failure to comply ....
The drafters decided to include a post-sale notice requirement
for consumer-goods transactions but, in a concession to creditor
concerns, provided only minimum penalties for creditor failures
regarding the notice ....
Consumer representatives asserted that there is some practice,
particularly in automobile finance, ofthe creditor always bidding in
at the amount of the debt and expenses and then reselling the car.
In that case, a notice might alert a debtor that the collateral had been
bought by the creditor at ... such a low price that it suggests that
the sale was not commercially reasonable. However, the statute
does not require an accounting ifthere is neither a deficiency nor a
surplus; there is not even a right to request an accounting. Also,
there is no obligation to give the notice if the creditor waives the
right to a deficiency in a record.402
D. MISCELLANEOUS RULES INVOLVING OR SPECIALLY AFFECTING
CONSUMERS
I. As noted earlier, Article 9 does not regulate consumer-con-
signor consignments.403
2. The corresponding amendments to Article I redefine "buyer in
ordinary course." The class of buyers in ordinary course is limited to
buyel11 who take possession ofthe goods or have "a right to recover the
goods from the seller under Article 2 ... ,'>404 A proposed revision to
Article 2 gives consumer buyers a special right to recover goods from a
seller. Proposed revised section 2-502 provides:
402. Benfield. supra note 327, at 1274-75.
403. R.U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(20)(c).
404. Proposed Amendment to § 1-201(9).
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Buyer's Right to Goods on Seller's Repudiation, Failure to
Deliver or Insolvency
(I) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) and even though the
goods have not been shipped a buyer who has paid a part or all of
the price of goods in which he has a special property under the
provisions ofthe immediately preceding section may on making and
keeping good a tender ofany unpaid portion of their price recover
them from the seller if:
(a) in the case ofgoods bought for personal, family, or
household purposes, the seller repudiates or fails to deliver as
required by the contract; or
(b) in all cases, the seller becomes insolvent within ten
days after receipt of the first installment on their price.
(2) The buyer's right to recover the goods under subsection
(I )(a) vests upon acquisition ofa special property, even ifthe seller
had not then repudiated or failed to deliver.
(3) Ifthe identification creating his special property has been
made by the buyer he acquires the right to recover the goods only
if they conform to the contract for sale.
The proposed revisions to Articles 1 and 2 have yet to be promulgated.
If adopted, it would appear that consumer buyers will have a statutory
right to specific performance upon identification of the goods to the
contract. It would also appear that if the goods are not identified to the
contract,405 consumer buyers will have a breach of contract action
against their sellers who are probably in or on the way to bankruptcy.
Assume prospective car buyer (Buyer) goes to local car dealer
(Dealer). Unbeknownst to Dealer's secured lender (Bank) and Buyer,
Dealer is selling cars out of trust. Buyer orders a midnight blue 2001
Cabrio with all the options. Buyer makes a sizeable down payment.
Dealer does not have a midnight blue 2001 cabrio in stock. Buyer may
be in for a rude (and costly) surprise when Bank learns about Dealer
fraud and shuts Dealer down. If the car is not in Dealer's stock, Dealer
cannot ship, mark or otherwise designate the car as Buyer's. If Dealer
defaults before identification of the cabrio, Buyer is limited to a breach
405. "Identification" is a term of art defined in § 2·501. Goods must be existing to be
identified. So long as the goods are in existence. identification occurs when the parties' contract
says it occurs. If the parties' agreement is silent, identification occurs when the seller ships, marks
or otherwise designates the goods as belonging to the buyer's contract.
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of contract claim against Dealer. That's it and it's not much if Dealer
fi les bankruptcy.406
3. Revised Article 9 requires security agreement descriptions to be
more specific in consumer transactions involving "consumer goods, a
security entitlement, a securities account, or a commodity account.''''07
This is to "prevent debtors from inadvertently encumbering certain
property ...."408 The security agreement cannot describe such property
by Article 9 type alone. A description will be sufficient regarding
consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities account, or a
commodity account if the description reasonably identifies what is
described and "contains a descriptive component beyond the 'type'
alone.''''09
X. BANKRUPTCY IMPLICATIONS
Short-term, Revised Article 9's new choice-of-law and filing rules
in conjunction with its transition rules will produce major confusion.
They are sure to provide a steady supply of unperfected interests for
bankruptcy trustees to avoid under the strong-arm clause. Lapses or
interruptions in perfection with new perfection dates will create
preference exposure.
What are Revised Article 9's long-term implications for bank-
ruptcy, in particular, its effects on unsecured creditors and a Chapter 11
debtor's ability to reorganize? For sure, Revised Article 9 makes life
significantly easier for the secured creditor. And that makes bankruptcy
less threatening. For corporate debtors, the creditor need only file once,
centrally, in the state ofthe debtor's incorporation, and be done with it.
It can file to perfect its interest in instruments. It can file an "all assets"
financing statement. It can take an Article 9 security interest in the
commercial debtor's deposit accounts and tort claims. The definition of
406. 11 U.S.c. § 507(a)(6)( 1998 & 2001 Supp.) gives a sixth priority to unsecured claims
of individuals "arising from the deposit ... of money in connection with the purchase, lease, or
rental of property, or the purchase of services, for the personal, family, or household use of such
individuals, that were not delivered or provided." This priority claim is capped at $ 2,100 as of
April I, 2001. Although it sounds good in the abstract, it presupposes that the bankruptcy estate
has sufficient unencumbered assets to pay priority claims down to the sixth rung. That may be a
big and unwarranted assumption under Revised Article 9.
407. R.U.C.C. § 9-108(e)(2).
408. Id. § 9-108 cmt. 5.
409.1d.
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"proceeds" seems to encompass any property remotely related, con-
nected, derivative of or associated with the collateral:
"Proceeds" means ... (A) whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease,
license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral; (8) whatever
is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral; (C) rights
arising out ofcollateral; (D) to the extent ofthe value ofcollateral,
claims arising out of the loss, nonconformity, or interference with
the use of, defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, the
collateral; or (E) to the extent of the value of collateral and to the
extent payable to the debtor or the secured party, insurance payable
by reason of the loss or nonconformity of, defects or infringement
of rights in, or damage to, the collateral.410
Of course, courts in bankruptcy are not bound by this expansive
definition although they might choose to follow it to maintain equilib-
rium between rights in and outside of bankruptcy. Revised Article 9
does away with § 9-306(4)'s threat to the Article 9 creditor's claim to its
debtor's commingled accounts in an insolvency proceeding.411
In a word, Revised Article 9 dramatically expands the range of
property available as Article 9 collateral. It vastly simplifies the process
of taking, perfecting and maintaining a perfected interest in it. Will all
these changes make a difference? Presumably, they will make it much
harder for the trustee to find unperfected security interests to avoid under
section 544(a).
Will the changes permit the Article 9 creditor to take and have it
all? The question assumes a creditor cannot take and have it all now to
the detriment of unsecured creditors. And that assumption is open to
question. Although Revised Article 9 permits an Article 9 secured
transaction regarding deposit accounts as original collateral, creditors
presently can and do take security interests in deposit accounts. They
just do so under other law and with significant uncertainty and risk.
Moreover, more often than not, the creditor has an Article 9 security
interest in the debtor's deposit accounts because it represents proceeds
of its collateral. The same holds true for commercial tort claims and any
other property a creditor wants as collateral.
410. Id. § 9-102(a)(64).
411. Former Article 9 limited a creditor's secured claim to commingled funds to no more
than the cash proceeds the debtorreceived during the IO-days preceding its insolvency case. U.c.c.
§ 9-306(4)(d)(ii).
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Arguably, it is not the expansion in Article 9's coverage but the
simplification of the process that will have the biggest impact in
bankruptcy. If taking and perfecting a security interest in everything is
almost fool proof, any fool will be able to bankruptcy-proof its right to
be paid. And that will mean little to nothing for the unsecureds unless
the secured creditor chooses to share its bounty. In addition, it will give
secured creditors an absolute veto power over their debtors' attempts to
reorgamze.
Attorneys for debtors and unsecured creditors anxiously await the
reaction of bankruptcy judges to Revised Article 9. The ball, it would
appear, is back in their court.
